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A LINGUISTIC JUSTIFICATION FOR  
PROTECTING “GENERIC” TRADEMARKS 
Jake Linford 
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 110 (2015) 
ABSTRACT 
A trademark is created when a new meaning is added to an 
existing word or when a new word is invented in order to 
identify the source of a product. This Article contends that 
trademark law fails in critical ways to reflect our knowledge of 
how words gain or lose meaning over time and how new 
meanings become part of the public lexicon, a phenomenon 
commonly referred to as semantic shift. Although trademark 
law traditionally turns on protecting consumers from confusing 
ambiguity, some of its doctrines ignore consumer perception in 
whole or in part. In particular, the doctrine of trademark 
incapacity—also known as the de facto secondary meaning 
doctrine—denies trademark protection to a term that was once a 
generic product designation, even if consumers now see the term 
primarily as a source-signifying trademark.  
Analyzing trademark acquisition through the lens of 
semantic shift sheds light on how the trademark incapacity 
doctrine misunderstands both the nature of language and the 
role of consumer perception in shaping trademark’s competition 
policy. Courts and scholars suggest that a generic term will 
rarely acquire source significance, and that even if it does, there 
are competitive, conceptual, and administrative grounds for 
denying trademark protection. The standard account is 
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mistaken: restriction of meaning—of which the change from a 
generic product designation to a source signifier is one 
example—happens frequently across time and across languages. 
In addition, understanding how and why restriction occurs 
highlights flaws in common justifications for trademark 
incapacity. This Article proposes replacing the doctrine of 
trademark incapacity with the primary significance test already 
applied at other stages of trademark litigation. If there is 
evidence that a majority of consumers have come to see the term 
as source-signifying rather than product designating, the law 
should recognize that source significance and the term should 
qualify for federal trademark protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A term that designates a singular source for goods and 
services, rather than the goods or services themselves, qualifies 
for protection as a trademark. Trademark law thus turns in 
large part on when a word or symbol acquires and loses source-
signifying meaning in the eyes of consumers. While 
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linguistics—the study of symbols and their meanings—has 
made limited inroads in the analysis of trademark law and 
policy,1 the existing scholarship has yet to mine a cornerstone 
concept in linguistics: semantic shift.2 The study of semantic 
shift in historical and cognitive semantic literatures is the 
study of how a given word changes over time—first by entering 
the public lexicon, and then by gaining or losing meanings.3 
These new words and meanings enter the lexicon as speakers 
search for new ways to express themselves. As Stephen 
Ullmann recognized half a century ago, “The need to find a new 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark 
Law, in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 140, 
157 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that while trademark law 
should not become beholden to linguistics, linguistic principles are 
embedded in trademark law, and linguistic theory can provide a means for 
uncovering “the inevitable prescriptive content of supposedly descriptive 
assessments of trademark claims”); Alan Durant, How Can I Tell the 
Trade Mark on a Piece of Gingerbread from All the Other Marks on It? 
Naming and Meaning in Verbal Trade Mark Signs, in TRADE MARKS AND 
BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 107, 132 (Lionel Bently et al. 
eds., 2008) (suggesting that pragmatics and discourse analysis, the 
branches of linguistics that investigate language in use, are most likely to 
contribute to our understanding of the important issues in trademark 
law); Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA 
L. REV. 621, 624 (2004) [hereinafter Beebe, Semiotic] (applying a branch of 
linguistics, semiotics, or the study of signs, to trademark law and arguing 
that the “grammar [of trademark law] must be understood not simply in 
economic, but also in linguistic terms”); Laura A. Heymann, The 
Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1320-21 (2010) 
(arguing that incorporating linguistic theory on language formation can 
help trademark law better reflect consumers’ perceptions of language); 
Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & Glenn L. Christensen, An Empirical 
and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1033, 1068-69 (2009) (applying psychological and brand 
perception literature to challenge Beebe’s semiotic analysis); Regan 
Smith, Note, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous 
and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 452 (2007) 
(applying semiotic theory to argue for reforming the scandalous marks 
prohibition in trademark law); Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity 
and Brand Protection, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 75 (2014) (analyzing trademark 
dilution and genericness in light of psycholinguistics literature on 
semantic ambiguity resolution). 
2 Other scholars refer to these phenomena as semantic change, semantic 
progression or semantic drift. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT & 
RICHARD B. DASHER, REGULARITY IN SEMANTIC CHANGE 1 (2002) (defining 
semantic change as a shift “from one linguistically coded meaning to 
another”). 
3 STEPHEN ULLMANN, SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF 
MEANING 209-10 (1962) (“Whenever a new name is required to denote a 
new object or idea, we can do one of three things: form a new word from 
existing elements; borrow a term from a foreign language or some other 
source; lastly, alter the meaning of an old word.”).  
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name is . . . an extremely important cause of semantic 
changes.”4 
Simply put, semantic shift is change in the meaning of a 
word. The process of creating trademark meaning shares many 
characteristics with other types of semantic shift. A trademark 
is a word, phrase, or symbol that identifies goods or services 
from a particular source.5 When a word or symbol gains source-
signifying meaning, it qualifies for protection as a trademark. 
Like other forms of semantic shift, investing a trademark with 
meaning adds a new entry to the commercial lexicon. For 
example, the Beatles plucked APPLE from among many pre-
existing options as a trademark for their record label, while 
Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak picked APPLE as a trademark 
for personal computers. At other times, a trademark is an 
entirely new entry into the lexicon. For instance, the word 
XEROX did not exist before it was coined as a designation for 
photocopiers. In both cases, language changes to accommodate 
new terms or new meanings for existing terms.  
As a doctrinal matter, whether a given word obtains 
protection as a trademark turns in part on the relationship 
between the claimed mark and the word or words from which it 
is derived. That relationship is mapped out along a spectrum of 
inherent strength, most famously articulated in Abercrombie & 
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.6 The court in Abercrombie 
established that the strength of a mark’s claim to trademark 
protection depends on the likelihood that consumers will be 
able to invest the mark with source-signifying meaning, based 
on the distance between the mark chosen and the good it 
signifies. While scholars have criticized the Abercrombie 
spectrum as inaccurate or an unwelcome distraction from more 
crucial inquiries,7 these categories generally reflect regular 
forms of semantic shift.8 
However, the synchronicity between theories of semantic 
shift and the legal reality of trademark acquisition breaks 
down when we reach the treatment of “generic” trademarks—
                                                
4 Id. at 210. 
5 This article is limited to trademarks comprised of words and does not 
address whether these principles could also apply to trade dress or design 
marks. 
6 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
7 For a summary of these arguments, see Jake Linford, The False 
Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive and Suggestive 
Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2585114, [hereinafter Linford, False 
Dichotomy]. 
8 See infra Part II.A. 
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words that identify, or have identified, a good or service—but 
subsequently acquire source-signifying meaning. Under the 
doctrine of “trademark incapacity,”9 courts dismiss evidence 
that consumers perceive a term as source-signifying, cabining 
the evidence as an indication merely of de facto—i.e., legally 
insignificant—secondary meaning.10 
For example, Microsoft Corporation sued Lindows.com, Inc. 
for trademark infringement, alleging that Lindows.com’s use of 
LINDOWS as a mark for a computer operating system 
infringed Microsoft’s prior rights in WINDOWS as a mark for 
its operating system.11 In response, Lindows.com challenged 
the WINDOWS mark on genericness grounds.12 When 
Microsoft adopted the WINDOWS mark in 1985, computer 
programmers and competitors were using “windows” as a noun 
to designate a graphical user interface (“GUI”) or its windowing 
capability.13 Microsoft argued that the WINDOWS mark was 
no longer generic because the primary meaning of “windows” in 
the computing context had changed from designating GUIs to 
signifying Microsoft’s WINDOWS operating system. Microsoft 
provided consumer surveys in which “67% of the relevant 
consumer population identified ‘Windows’ as the ‘brand name 
of a product put out by one company.’”14 But despite this 
evidence, the district court refused to give an instruction that 
would have allowed the jury to consider the change in 
trademark meaning.15  
                                                
9 Louis Altman coined the phrase “trademark incapacity.” 3 LOUIS ALTMAN 
& MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES § 20:33 (4th ed. 1983); see also id. §§ 18:17 n.56, 18:20 n.3, 
23:37 n.47, 40:57. This process goes by other names, including the better-
known but unwieldy “de facto secondary meaning doctrine.” This article 
primarily uses the term trademark incapacity. 
10 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (describing a generic term as “one that refers, 
or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which the 
particular product is a species” and holding that proof of source 
significance in the eyes of consumers, “by virtue of which some ‘merely 
descriptive’ marks may be registered, cannot transform a generic term 
into a subject for trademark”). 
11 Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1397, 1398, 1400 
(W.D. Wash. 2002) [hereinafter Lindows I] 
12 Id. at 1404-07. 
13 Id. at 1400; Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1371, 
1373-74 (W.D. Wash. 2002) [Lindows II]. 
14 Lindows I, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1407-1410. 
15 Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows Com, Inc., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863, 1864 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004) (refusing to instruct the jury that “the [WINDOWS] 
trademark would [ ] be valid today so long as the primary significance of 
the term today is not generic.”) [Lindows III]. The court of appeals refused 
to hear an interlocutory appeal on the issue. Microsoft Corp. v. 
Lindows.com, Inc., No. 04-80024, 2004 WL 1208044 (9th Cir. May 19, 
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As a matter of black letter law, the court in Lindows.com 
properly rejected Microsoft’s requested jury instruction because 
under the doctrine of trademark incapacity, if the term chosen 
was once generic, any subsequent addition of trademark 
meaning is irrelevant. But the doctrine of trademark incapacity 
is inconsistent with one of the most standard types of semantic 
shift: restriction. When a word is restricted, it undergoes a shift 
in meaning from a broad designator for all members within a 
category to a prototypical member of the category.16 For 
example, in Old English, hound or hund once meant any kind 
of dog, but the meaning was restricted over time to long-eared 
hunting dogs.17 A generic term that acquires source 
significance is another manifestation of restriction in meaning. 
For instance, in the 1800s, kiss once identified any small 
sweetmeat or piece of confection,18 but kiss or kisses now brings 
to mind a particular type of candy—the teardrop-shaped 
chocolates offered for sale by the Hershey Company.19 While 
restriction happens frequently, the doctrine of trademark 
incapacity requires courts to ignore evidence that so-called 
generic terms have acquired source significance in the minds of 
consumers. 
More broadly, the doctrine of trademark incapacity is also 
incongruous with trademark law’s ostensible focus on 
acknowledging consumer perception and protecting consumers 
from confusion. Trademark protection is typically justified on 
the ground that consumers use the trademark to distinguish 
between the goods and services of different vendors.20 Thus, 
trademark law looks to the consumer as the target audience by 
which protection and infringement should be measured. 
Trademark incapacity turns away from evidence about 
                                                                                                         
2004) [Lindows IV]. Microsoft subsequently bought the LINDOWS mark 
for $20 million. Kim Peterson, Microsoft sues Lindows—then pays $20 
million, SEATTLE TIMES, July 20, 2004, http://old.seattletimes.com 
/html/businesstechnology/2001983512_lindows20.html. 
16 DIRK GEERAERTS, THEORIES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS 26-27 (2010) 
[hereinafter GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS]. 
17 TERRY CROWLEY & CLAIRE BOWERN, AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORICAL 
LINGUISTICS 200 (4th ed. 2010); Willem B. Hollmann, Semantic Change, in 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE: DESCRIPTION, VARIATION AND CONTEXT 525, 528 
(Jonathan Culpeper et al. eds., 2009). 
18 Kiss, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/103 
691 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (“Name for a small sweetmeat or piece of 
confectionery; a sugar-plum.”). 
19 See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text. The protection also provides 
an incentive for those vendors to maintain consistent quality because the 
vendor is allowed to internalize the value of the reputation or goodwill 
acquired in the trademark. 
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consumer perception if the court concludes a potential mark 
ever carried generic meaning. 
Trademark incapacity might be justified if generic terms 
rarely acquired a critical mass of source significance. If that 
were so, we might prevent costly errors by ignoring the 
occasional case where a generic term undergoes restriction and 
its primary meaning narrows to source significance. But in 
fact, generic terms take on source signifying meaning quite 
often. Case law provides multiple examples where courts have 
ignored evidence that consumers perceive an ostensible generic 
product designation as a source-signifying trademark.21  In 
addition, linguistic research suggests that restriction happens 
frequently—perhaps more frequently than any other form of 
semantic shift.22 Unfortunately, courts and scholars mistakenly 
assume that the shift of a generic term to source-signifying 
meaning happens infrequently precisely because courts almost 
never grant trademark protection to former generic terms.23 
The error-cost rationale for trademark incapacity is thus 
circular. Indeed, ignoring restriction that occurs to generic 
terms—and the development of source significance in the eyes 
of consumers—may well increase error in trademark 
litigation.24 
Scholars and courts have also defended trademark 
incapacity on normative grounds, identifying several interlaced 
justifications for the doctrine: concerns about granting mark 
owners monopoly power or causing language depletion; a 
general distrust of trademark-owning incumbents; and an 
application of the functionality doctrine due to a perception 
that generic terms are immutable like tangible product 
features. However, understanding how trademark acquisition 
reflects the broader phenomena of semantic shift provides an 
avenue for refuting those justifications.25 
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I outlines 
trademark law’s commitment to consumer search and 
consumer perception, before turning to the conflict between 
that ostensible commitment and the doctrine of trademark 
incapacity. Some scholars have offered critiques of trademark 
incapacity, recognizing the problem of ontological rejections of 
source significance without providing a theory for why it is 
important to acknowledge language change in the ex ante 
                                                
21 See infra Part I.B. 
22 See infra Part II.B. 
23 See infra Part I.C 
24 See infra Part III.A.1. 
25 See infra Part III.A.2. 
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generic context as well as in other contexts. Part II provides 
such a theoretical basis, beginning with a brief discussion of 
the drivers of semantic shift before describing how trademark 
acquisition is a form of semantic shift. While trademark law 
reflects many regular forms of semantic shift, the doctrine of 
trademark incapacity drives a wedge between the law of 
trademark acquisition and the reality of semantic shift. The 
shift from generic term to source-signifying trademark is an 
example of restriction, one of the most frequently occurring 
forms of semantic shift and one that increases the information 
conveyed by the restricted form.26 Part III makes the case for 
abandoning the doctrine of trademark incapacity in favor of the 
primary significance test already applied in cases where a 
protected mark loses trademark significance and slides into 
genericness as a product designation. 
I. CONSUMER PERCEPTION AND TRADEMARK 
INCAPACITY 
As this Part explains, the goal of trademark law is to lower 
consumer search costs and prevent consumer confusion. The 
dominant justification for trademark law is thus tied to 
consumer perception. The doctrine of trademark incapacity, 
however, ignores evidence of consumer perception and instead 
disqualifies marks derived from generic terms due to their 
etymology. The ostensible rationales underlying the doctrine of 
trademark incapacity cannot justify the refusal to consider 
evidence of consumer perception. 
A. Trademark Law, Consumer Perception, and 
Consumer Confusion 
The dominant rationale for trademark protection is 
reducing consumer search costs.27 A trademark can serve as an 
                                                
26 APRIL M.S. MCMAHON, UNDERSTANDING LANGUAGE CHANGE 178-79 (1994). 
27 Cf. Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. 
REV. 1171, 1190 n.93 (2005) (“[I]f trademark law were to abandon 
consumer benefit as a foundation, there could simply be no plausible 
theoretical foundation for trademark regulation.”). While reducing 
consumer search costs is the dominant rationale, some scholars have 
provided an alternate justification for trademark protection. See, e.g., 
Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 2020, 2025 (2005) [hereinafter Beebe, Search and Persuasion] 
(proposing two varieties of consumer sophistication: search sophistication, 
the ability of consumers to distinguish between similar trademarks; and 
persuasion sophistication, their capacity to choose products independently 
of marketer influence); Margaret Chon, Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in 
Global Values Networks, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 935 (2014) (reexamining 
trademark law through the heuristic of brand citizenship); Mark P. 
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indicator that products bearing the mark originate from a 
single seller.28 Consumers can thus rely on the trademark to 
identify products they wish to buy, which reduces the cost of 
finding those products. While there are other accounts 
justifying trademark protection,29 this Article will critique 
trademark incapacity from within the dominant account. 
Questions of whether a trademark qualifies for protection 
and whether a trademark has been infringed are answered by 
assessing consumer perception of that mark.30 Some 
trademarks are considered inherently capable of distinguishing 
the goods or services of one producer from those of others, and 
it is presumed that consumers see them as source-signifying. 
Other trademarks are seen as merely descriptive of some 
quality or feature of the product or service, and protection is 
extended only if the mark acquires a secondary, source-
signifying meaning.31 Distinguishing a term that is merely 
descriptive (and is thus unprotectable) from one that is 
inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning (and 
is thus protectable) requires assessing whether consumers 
better understand a given term to describe a characteristic of a 
                                                                                                         
McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 
773, 821 (criticizing the failure of the consumer search cost theory to limit 
the expansion of trademark rights); Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1245 (2011) (arguing that psychological and marketing 
research can manipulate consumer perception, weakening the consumer 
search account).  
28 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995); 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987). 
29 See, e.g., Jake Linford, Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor: 
Productive Use and Property Acquisition, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 703 
(2013) (describing how trademark law bases protection on productive use 
by the mark owner) [hereinafter Linford, Adverse Possessor]; Mark P. 
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2007) (arguing that “trademark law, like all 
unfair competition law, sought to protect producers from illegitimate 
diversions of their trade by competitors”). 
30 See In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(discussing the use of online resources to measure consumer perception); 
Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“Consumer perceptions are relevant in determining whether a non-
inherently distinctive mark has acquired secondary meaning and should 
therefore be treated as a strong mark.”) (internal citations omitted); G. 
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 996 n.10 
(7th Cir. 1989) (“[C]onsumer perception should be measured by 
considering the mark as applied to the product in question and the 
reaction of the consumer audience to which the trademark is directed in 
the marketplace.”) (internal citations omitted).  
31 See infra notes 121-144 and accompanying text. 
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product, or to signify the source of the product itself.32 The 
perception of “the average potential consumer in the context of 
the existing marketplace and exposed to the information 
currently available in the marketplace” weighs heavily in 
assessing whether a mark merits protection, or whether 
confusion has occurred.33 
Trademark law is likewise aimed at preventing or 
correcting “confusion among consumers regarding the origin of 
the goods [or services] offered” to the public.34 Consumer 
confusion often occurs when a junior user adopts a mark 
identical or sufficiently similar to the mark of a senior user to 
identify the same or similar products or services.35 That 
confusion can increase consumer search costs.36 Trademark law 
thus bars not only the use of a mark identical to that of the 
senior user, but also the use of a mark that is confusingly 
similar to the senior user’s mark.37  
While the dominant rationale for trademark protection is to 
prevent consumer confusion, there are aspects of trademark 
law that are surprisingly disconnected from consumer 
perception. This Article focuses on one such divergence: 
trademark law has developed a doctrine of “trademark 
incapacity,”38 more commonly referred to as a principle of de 
facto secondary meaning.39 If a court concludes that the mark 
was ever a generic term, any source-signifying meaning the 
                                                
32 See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 952 
(7th Cir. 1992).  
33 Heileman, 873 F.2d at 995; see also Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, 
The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
1251, 1260 (2014). 
34 Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 551 
(6th Cir. 2005); see also Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 721, 722 (2004) (“Confusion among consumers is the grave 
iniquity against which trademark laws and jurisprudence are intended to 
guard.”). 
35 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile 
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 482 (2005) (“An 
infringement of a trademark is one that increases consumer search costs, 
normally by confusing consumers.”). 
36 James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 
1976) (“The trademark laws exist not to ‘protect’ trademarks, but, as 
above indicated, to protect the consuming public from confusion, 
concomitantly protecting the trademark owner’s right to a non-confused 
public.”). 
37 Am. Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 381 (1926). 
38 3 CALLMANN, supra note 9, § 20:33 (coining the term “trademark 
incapacity”). 
39 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological 
Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 730 (1999) [hereinafter 
Dinwoodie, Ontology]. 
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mark may have later acquired is dismissed as mere “de facto 
secondary meaning” bearing no legal significance.40 The generic 
term can never acquire trademark protection, even if 
consumers have come to identify the mark with a specific 
brand or product. The next Section describes the doctrine of 
trademark incapacity in more detail, highlighting how that 
doctrine is disconnected from the consumer search and 
consumer perception justifications for trademark law. 
B. Trademark Incapacity in the Case Law 
Under the doctrine of trademark incapacity,41 a term that is 
generic ex ante for a genus of goods or services cannot be 
transformed into a trademark by the commercial behavior that 
typically provides a basis for acquiring secondary meaning.42 
As stated by the court in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting 
World, Inc.,43 generic terms, which “refe[r], or ha[ve] come to be 
understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular 
product is a species,” cannot acquire trademark protection.44 
The rationale for trademark incapacity is that “no matter how 
much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured 
                                                
40 See, e.g., Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry’s Seafood Restaurant, Inc., 240 
F.3d 251, 254-255 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that because crab house was 
obviously generic for a restaurant that served crab, “it [was] not necessary 
to determine whether the term [became] generic through common use, 
rendering Hunt’s customer survey irrelevant”); Liquid Controls Corp. v. 
Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 938 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (discounting 
study that indicated source significance of “liquid control” as not relevant 
to whether term is generic); Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing 
Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that because “light” for low-
calorie beer was obviously generic, “proof” of secondary meaning “would 
not advance [plaintiff’s] trademark claim, because . . . if a word is generic 
it ‘can never become a trademark’”); Lindows III, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1864, 
(instructing jury that a genericness inquiry should consider the time the 
claimant began using the mark, and refusing to instruct the jury that a 
trademark is valid if the mark was generic when the claimant entered the 
market but had subsequently acquired source significance); 2 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:47 
(describing how courts discount evidence of secondary meaning acquired 
in generic terms) (4th ed. 2015). 
41 See 3 CALLMANN, supra note 9, § 20:33. 
42 See, e.g., In re Minnetonka, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 772, 782 (T.T.A.B. 1981) 
(defining a generic term as one “so highly descriptive that no quantum of 
evidence of acquired distinctiveness is sufficient to qualify it for 
registration under Section 2(f)”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 15 cmt. b (2007) (“[T]he public interest in maintaining 
access to generic terms precludes the recognition of trademark rights.”). 
43 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) (creating a hierarchy of conceptual trademark 
strength based on the degree to which the mark directly describes the 
product or service).  
44 Id. at 9. 
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into promoting the sale of its merchandise, and what success it 
has achieved in securing public identification, it cannot deprive 
competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an 
article by its name.”45 Evidence that consumers perceive the 
term as a trademark is thus ignored or dismissed.46  
This bar against a generic term acquiring distinctiveness is 
easiest to understand at the extreme. For example, in the 
absence of the trademark incapacity doctrine, a seller of 
computers might still find it difficult to secure COMPUTER as 
a mark for its goods. It is unlikely that the seller could 
persuade a critical mass of consumers that COMPUTER 
designates only the seller’s computers marketed by that 
particular producer. The difficulty of establishing such a shift 
in meaning suggests that a prophylactic rule like the 
trademark incapacity doctrine might have some use at the far 
edge of the Abercrombie spectrum.47 
 There are, however, many cases where semantic shift has 
been measured, source significance acquired, and evidence of 
consumer perception nevertheless ignored. For example, in 
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli,48 the court marshaled the 
ex ante bar in dismissing evidence that 98 percent of 
consumers viewed the term HOG as a source signifier for 
Harley-Davidson’s motorcycles, rather than as a generic 
designation for large motorcycles.49 In another case, 
Hotels.com, L.P. applied to register HOTELS.COM as a service 
mark for its online hotel booking services.50 Hotels.com 
presented evidence that 76 percent of survey respondents 
identified HOTELS.COM as a trademark instead of a common 
or generic name.51 But the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(“TTAB”) concluded that HOTELS.COM was generic because 
“hotels” was a generic designation for the provision of hotel 
booking services and the addition of “.com” was insufficient to 
permit trademark protection.52 The TTAB thus refused to 
                                                
45 Id. 
46 A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 304 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“Underlying the genericness doctrine is the principle that some terms so 
directly signify the nature of the product that interests of competition 
demand that other producers be able to use them even if terms have or 
might become identified with a source and so acquire ‘de facto’ secondary 
meaning.”). 
47 See infra Part III.A.1 
48 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999). 
49 Jerre B. Swann, Genericism Rationalized, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 639, 654 
n.96 (1999) (citing the Grottanelli Appellate Record at A76). 
50 In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
51 In re Hotels.com, L.P., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1100, 1110-12 (T.T.A.B. 2008). 
52 Id. at 1100-11. But see In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 
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credit the survey and affirmed the trademark examiner’s 
decision to refuse registration. The TTAB noted, however, that 
should the applicant persuade a court on appeal that the mark 
was not ex ante generic, the survey provided sufficient evidence 
of acquired distinctiveness to support registration. Thus, the 
Board’s determination of ex ante genericness was fatal to the 
registration of the mark even in the face of otherwise 
persuasive evidence of that HOTELS.COM had acquired 
secondary meaning. 
Additionally, the trademark incapacity doctrine often 
tempts courts to invoke the ex ante bar in cases where the 
mark is a compound word or phrase, despite the well-
established “anti-dissection” rule that trademarks are 
protected as a whole and should be evaluated as a whole.53 
Courts mistakenly apply the ex ante bar to compound marks 
whose components appear clearly generic or “highly 
descriptive,”54 even if the compound term as a whole has not 
                                                                                                         
(Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (“[I]n unique circumstances a [top level domain indicator] could 
perform a source-indicating function.”). The court in Oppedahl & Larson 
explained:  
Only in rare instances will the addition of a TLD indicator to a 
descriptive term operate to create a distinctive mark. In those rare 
instances, a term that is not distinctive by itself may acquire some 
additional meaning from the addition of a TLD, such as “.com,” 
“.net,” etc. In those unusual circumstances, the addition of the TLD 
can show Internet-related distinctiveness, intimating some 
“Internet feature” of the item.  
Id. 
53 See, e.g., Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc., v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 
538, 545-46 (1920) (“The commercial impression of a trade-mark is 
derived from it as a whole, not from its elements separated and considered 
in detail. For this reason it should be considered in its entirety.”); see also 
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(ruling that the decision by the district court to break the EVEREADY 
mark down into its component pieces was clearly erroneous because 
“[w]ords which could not individually become a trademark may become 
one when taken together”); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40 § 11:27. 
54 Under § 1052(f) of the Lanham Act, a descriptive term can be presumed to 
have acquired distinctiveness upon a showing of five years of 
“substantially exclusive and continuous use.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006). 
That presumption was historically relaxed for marks that are “so highly 
descriptive” they were deemed incapable of acquiring secondary meaning. 
In re Institutional Investor, Inc., 229 U.S.P.Q. 614, 617-18 (C.C.P.A. 1986) 
(affirming decision by the trademark examiner that the mark 
INTERNATIONAL BANKING INSTITUTE for international banking 
seminars was “so highly descriptive or generic that it is utterly incapable 
of functioning as a trademark or acquiring distinctiveness, no matter 
what quantity of evidence of alleged distinctiveness or secondary meaning 
is submitted”). Some opinions suggest a relationship between the 
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been used as a product designation in the past. For example, in 
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman,55 the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that the term CHOCOLATE FUDGE for 
soda was generic for a rich, chocolate-flavored soda, although 
CHOCOLATE FUDGE had never before been used in that 
combination for that purpose.56 Likewise, TURBODIESEL was 
held generic for diesel engines even though the compound term 
had not previously been used by competitors or consumers in 
connection with diesel engines.57 
The trademark incapacity doctrine has not been uniformly 
applied, but the exceptions prove the rule. On occasion, the 
TTAB has recognized acquired distinctiveness in a formerly 
generic term. For example, in an unpublished opinion, the 
TTAB reversed a refusal by the Trademark Office to register 
the mark KISSES for chocolate candy.58 The TTAB recognized 
that the Hershey Company had acquired distinctiveness in 
KISSES, building up secondary meaning over ninety years.59 
This secondary meaning was reflected in a survey where 80 
percent of respondents identified KISSES as a trademark.60 
                                                                                                         
descriptiveness of the proposed mark and the proof required to establish 
secondary meaning. See, e.g., Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 
Ltd., 840 F.2d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he more descriptive the 
term, the greater the evidentiary burden to establish secondary 
meaning.”). 
55  808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986). 
56  The CHOCOLATE FUDGE case was a close call. The Seventh Circuit 
initially affirmed a preliminary injunction against a competitor’s use of 
the CHOCOLATE FUDGE designation, A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess 
Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1986), but later held that collateral 
estoppel precluded reconsideration of the Third Circuit’s finding of 
genericness, A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 859 F.2d 36 (7th 
Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit created its own genericness test outside of 
the primary significance test:  
[W]hen a producer introduces a product that differs from an 
established product class in a significant, functional characteristic, 
and uses the common descriptive term of that characteristic as its 
name, that new product becomes its own genus, and the term 
denoting the genus becomes generic if there is no commonly used 
alternative that effectively communicates the same functional 
information.  
Honickman, 808 F.2d at 293. 
57 Cummins Engine Co. v. Continental Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 892 (C.C.P.A. 
1966). 
58 In re Holmstead, Inc., No. 75/183,278 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 4, 2000). 
59 Id. at 11. 
60 Id. at 8. As the Board noted, 16.5 percent of respondents identified the 
KISSES mark as a generic term, compared with 9 percent who identified 
MILK DUDS as a generic term, and 4.4 percent who identified M&M’s as 
a generic term. 
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The court recognized secondary meaning despite substantial 
evidence amassed by the examiner that kiss started out as a 
generic designation for a small piece of confection or chocolate 
candy.61  
There is at least one other limited exception to the 
trademark incapacity doctrine. Marks that lose protection 
because of a slide into genericness have occasionally reacquired 
distinctiveness and thus regained trademark protection. Both 
SINGER for sewing machines and GOODYEAR RUBBER for 
“goods produced by the processes known as Goodyear’s 
invention” were found generic by the Supreme Court in the 
nineteenth century,62 but both marks reacquired trademark 
protection in the twentieth century.63 These trademark 
resurrection cases are perhaps outliers, because such 
restorations have occurred infrequently.64 However, trademark 
resurrection cases still indicate that the ex ante bar is not 
uniformly applied, at least in cases where the mark acquired 
secondary meaning before falling into genericness. The 
trademark incapacity doctrine thus appears not to consistently 
reach marks that held secondary meaning before they became 
generic. 
At its extreme, the doctrine of trademark incapacity is 
absurd. In the middle ages, code was a term both for a baptism 
robe or chrism cloth, and for pitch or cobbler’s wax.65 These 
meanings are obsolete and have been for centuries. It would be 
odd for a court to conclude that CODE is generic if used as a 
                                                
61 Id. at 4. See also Hershey Co. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., No. 07-1601, 
2011 WL 5508481, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2011) (unpublished) (concluding, 
in light of “Hershey’s multiple Teflon surveys offering direct evidence of 
the primary significance of KISSES as a brand to consumers . . . that a 
reasonable fact finder could not find the KISSES mark generic”). 
62 Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); Goodyear’s Rubber 
Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 602 (1888). 
63 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 n.3 (5th Cir. 1953) (affirming 
district court decision that Singer had, “by the constant and exclusive use 
of the name ‘Singer’ in designating sewing machines and other articles 
manufactured and sold by it and in advertising the same continuously and 
widely—recaptured from the public domain the same ‘Singer’”); Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. H. Rosenthal Co., 246 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Minn. 
1965) (holding that while the Supreme Court found that “Goodyear 
Rubber” was descriptive and could not be appropriated as a trademark, 
that case had “no bearing on the issue of secondary meaning”). 
64 Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism 
Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1832 (2007); 2 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 40, § 12:30. 
65 Code, n.2, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry 
/35579 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014); Code, n.3, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/35580 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
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trademark for baptistery clothing or for a sealant. 
Nevertheless, a strong form of trademark incapacity would bar 
recognition of any source significance, because as a historical 
matter, code was once a term used to describe both things. 
Trademark incapacity is not required by the language of 
the Lanham Act, which articulates the scope of federal 
trademark protection. Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act 
authorizes the Trademark Office to reject an application to 
register a trademark if it determines that the mark “is merely 
descriptive” of the goods or services of the applicant.66 But mere 
descriptiveness is not among the justifications for ignoring 
subsequently acquired source significance.67 Likewise, Section 
14 specifies that a trademark registration may be cancelled if 
the mark becomes generic, and mandates use of a primary 
significance test to determine whether or not the mark has 
become generic.68 There is no statutory requirement for 
treating a generic term as though it cannot acquire source 
significance.69 
Why, then, apply the doctrine of trademark incapacity? The 
next section summarizes standard justifications for trademark 
incapacity as well as critiques of the doctrine. This summary 
lays the groundwork for a discussion in Part II of what theories 
of semantic shift can teach us about trademark acquisition, and 
particularly the acquisition of source significance in a generic 
term. 
                                                
66 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (Lanham Act (L.A.) § 2(e)(1)). 
67 Id. § 1052(f) (noting that, with the exception of provisions other than  
§ 2(e)(1), “nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark 
used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s 
goods in commerce”). 
68 Id. § 1064(3) (L.A. § 14(3)). In 1984, Congress passed the Trademark 
Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-260, 98 Stat. 3335, to reverse the 
effect of the decision in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 
Inc., 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979), and to restate the traditional test for ex 
post genericness, which inquired into the primary significance of the term 
to the purchasing public. The primary significance test is now part of the 
statutory language, at least with regard to the generislide of a registered 
mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (L.A. § 14(3)) (“The primary significance of the 
registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation 
shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become 
the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has 
been used.”). 
69 If a generic term were construed to “compris[e] matter that, as a whole, is 
functional,” that would provide a basis under § 1052(e)(5) for denying 
registration, or under § 1064(3) for cancelling the registration. 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1052(e)(5), 1064(3) (L.A. §§ 2(e)(5), 14(3)). I argue in Part III.A.2(3), 
infra, that a generic term is different from a functional feature. 
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C. Standard Justifications for and Prior Critiques 
of Trademark Incapacity 
The standard justifications for trademark incapacity, 
discussed in more detail in Part III.A, fall into two overlapping 
categories. First, if a legitimate shift from a generic term to a 
source-signifying trademark happens rarely, the trademark 
incapacity doctrine might serve as a prophylactic rule to 
prevent courts from erroneously finding a source-signifying 
shift that does not exist, while avoiding the administrative 
costs that come with an inquiry into the alleged change.70 For 
example, Thomas McCarthy has considered at length whether 
a generic term may be “elevated over time into a trademark,”71 
concluding that such an event is extraordinarily rare.72 
McCarthy posits that such a shift would require “a radical 
change in consumer perception and usage of words,” which he 
identifies as happening only twice—in the Singer and Goodyear 
cases.73 The mistake, however, is in arguing that the requisite 
change in consumer perception rarely occurs because courts 
have rarely extended legal significance to it. In fact, the case 
law is full of circumstances where a claimant provides evidence 
of a shift from genericness to source significance, but the courts 
discount it.74 
Second, justifications for trademark incapacity articulate 
three intertwined rationales grounded in competition policy. 
One rationale argues that granting protection in “the common 
name of an article” may provide the first entrant with 
something approaching monopoly power to sell that product.75 
This concern is sometimes articulated as unease about 
“language depletion,”76 the notion that too many common terms 
might be appropriated as property, leaving new entrants 
                                                
70 Cf. Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 2099 (2004) [hereinafter Bone, Enforcement Costs]; see also infra 
Part III.A.1. 
71 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 12:30. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.; see also supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
74 See supra Part I.B. 
75 See, e.g., Am. Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creme Labs., Inc., 420 F.2d 1248, 1252 
(7th Cir. 1970); see also infra notes 210, 213-225 and accompanying text. 
76 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 
306 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that generic trademarks receive no protection 
and that the holder of such a mark obtains no right to exclude others, so 
that producers may not “deplete the stock of useful words by asserting 
exclusive rights in them”). But cf. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 
Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995) (rejecting a similar “color depletion” theory 
as a basis for denying trademark protection for the use of a particular 
color on a good). 
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without access to words needed to sell competing goods to the 
public.77 A related rationale favors protecting competitors over 
incumbents. These competition concerns are seen by others as 
a facet of the functionality doctrine,78 which bars trademark 
protection in product features that are essential elements of a 
given product.79 
Increasing competition is often seen as directly correlated 
with lowering consumer search costs,80 but competition policy 
and consumer confusion can pull in different directions. Some 
consumers will be confused in almost any conflict between 
junior and senior users of trademarks. Trademark law 
nevertheless ignores the confusion of those consumers unless 
the mark is distinct enough to justify concluding that many 
consumers see it as source-signifying, or in cases where limited 
numbers of consumers have testified of confusion, but a 
plaintiff’s case is otherwise not particularly strong.81 Thus, 
even if some consumers see a generic term as source-signifying 
and are consequently confused when competing producers use 
the term, the law might tolerate the confusion to preserve 
competition.82 
                                                
77 Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1242 (2008). 
78 See, e.g., Dinwoodie, Ontology, supra note 39, at 729-30. See also infra 
notes 235-239 and accompanying text. 
79 See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164 (“The functionality doctrine prevents 
trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s 
reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a 
producer to control a useful product feature.”). 
80 See, e.g., Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 14 
(1st Cir. 2008); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding 
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1345, 
1373-74 (2008) (“[T]he ultimate purpose of reducing consumer search costs 
is to facilitate the operation of [the] marketplace. If trademark law 
interferes with competition, trademark law must give way, or it will end 
up destroying the village in order to save it.”). 
81 See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. Shop at Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810 
(M.D. Tenn. 2000) (noting that sixteen instances of actual confusion 
“borders on insignificant” for a mass marketer like McDonald’s). 
82 See Soc’y of Fin. Examiners v. Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Examiners 
Inc., 41 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1995) (vacating summary judgment and 
injunctive relief in plaintiff’s favor because a question of fact remained on 
whether the purported mark was generic, and noting that “[e]ven total 
confusion, however, is irrelevant if [the purported mark] constitutes a 
‘generic’ mark”); cf. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and 
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 793 (2004) 
[hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Consumer Search Costs] (“[T]he genericness 
doctrine can impose search costs on consumers, particularly when a once-
famous mark such as ‘aspirin’ or ‘thermos’ becomes generic.”). 
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Critics of trademark incapacity have taken different 
positions on the justifications outlined above. Scholars like 
Graeme Dinwoodie have noted the problem of handling 
trademarks ontologically.83 In the words of Thomas McCarthy, 
the doctrine of trademark incapacity is problematic because it 
empowers a court to “assume that which is to be decided.”84 But 
even McCarthy falls prey to the mistaken notion that a shift 
from a generic term to a source-signifying designation is, by 
nature, vanishingly rare.85 Louis Altman instead urges courts 
to inquire whether “there has been a complete transformation 
of [generic into source-signifying] meaning,”86 in essence 
requiring a complete replacement of any generic meaning with 
secondary meaning before trademark protection may vest.87 
Some critics see genericness and source significance as 
opposite sides of the same coin.88 This binary view 
misapprehends the issue. As discussed in more detail in Part 
II, a word can have multiple senses, and can even have 
conflicting meanings. Likewise, a term used as a trademark 
has the potential to bear both product identifying and source-
signifying meanings, at least in the minds of different 
consumers, and perhaps in the mind of the same consumer at 
different times.89 The binary view thus misses some of the 
complexity that semantic shift theories can help us appreciate. 
                                                
83 Dinwoodie, Ontology, supra note 39, at 729. 
84 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 12:47; see also 3 CALLMANN, supra note 9, 
§ 20:33.  
85 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 12:47 (proposing leaving a slight opening 
for asserting a trademark in a formerly generic name “to accommodate 
the rare and extraordinary event that a generic name over a period of 
years loses it[s] generic significance and achieves trademark 
significance.”); cf. infra Part II.B. 
86 3 CALLMANN, supra note 9, § 20:33. Altman nevertheless concedes the 
anti-competitive argument “if the mark retains a substantial vestige of its 
original generic or descriptive meaning.” Id. 
87 See infra notes 282-285 and accompanying text for a critique of the 
replacement standard. 
88 See, e.g., Marc C. Levy, From Genericism to Trademark Significance: 
Deconstructing the De Facto Secondary Meaning Doctrine, 95 TRADEMARK 
REP. 1197, 1202 (2005) (“[T]here is no such thing as a ‘generic’ word with 
secondary meaning.”) (quoting Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing 
Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896, 906 (D.R.I. 1980), rev’d, 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 
1981)). 
89 Cf. Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 
YALE L.J. 1323, 1339-40 (1980) (discussing three possible types of 
consumer perception of “trademarked generic words”); Heymann, supra 
note 1, at 1342 (arguing that consumers can hold generic and source-
signifying meanings in mind simultaneously). 
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Other scholars see trademark incapacity as a subset of 
functionality. For example, Vanessa Bowman Pierce has 
argued that the genericness inquiry should be subsumed into a 
functionality inquiry.90 Pierce’s concept of functionality, 
however, is confined to preventing the protection of “core words 
to which all competitors may need access.” Thus, if “effective 
competition is possible” without the use of the term, “neither 
functionality nor genericism should preclude at least qualified 
protection” of the term.91 Vincent Palladino, on the other hand, 
expresses concern that at least “for products that are not 
unique, [equating] functionality and genericness seems 
unsound” because a competitor always needs to copy a 
functional element in order to compete, but does not need to 
use a word to compete “when the word has become associated 
with the products of only one producer.”92 Palladino’s argument 
is somewhat conclusory, and he buys into the same binary 
structure that plagues other critiques, but he points in the 
direction of the real conundrum, one that focuses on the 
importance of change.93 Functional features do not change, but 
language does. 
These critiques nevertheless fail to account for why it is 
important to focus on current rather than historic language 
usage. To encapsulate the argument that follows, language is 
dynamic, and language change appears to occur more rapidly 
now than at any point in history.94 Part II outlines how those 
                                                
90 Vanessa Bowman Pierce, If It Walks Like a Duck and Quacks Like a Duck, 
Shouldn’t It Be a Duck?: How a “Functional” Approach Ameliorates the 
Discontinuity Between the “Primary Significance” Tests for Genericness 
and Secondary Meaning, 37 N.M. L. REV. 147, 185 (2007). 
91 Id. 
92 Vincent N. Palladino, Assessing Trademark Significance: Genericness, 
Secondary Meaning and Surveys, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 857, 869 (2002). 
93 Id.; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 15:24 (recognizing the inherent 
“fluidity” of trademark rights in his criticism of the strong form of de facto 
secondary meaning). 
94 The editors of the Barhart Dictionary of New English reported five 
thousand new words, or neologisms, between 1963 and 1972, roughly five 
hundred per year. See John Algeo, Where Do All the New Words Come 
From?, 55 AM. SPEECH 264, 267 (1980). But in the 1989 edition of the 
OED, editor John Simpson stated in the preface that “[t]he pace of 
inclusion of new words has been increased to a rate of about 4,000 per 
year.” John Simpson, Introduction to THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
(2d ed. 1989). Other authors have noted spikes in neologism during 
periods of great creative and literary output. See, e.g., GEOFFREY HUGHES, 
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH WORDS 27 (2000) (identifying a spike in neologisms 
at the turn of the seventeenth century). Communication technology also 
increases the rate with which new words are adopted. See, e.g., ALVIN 
TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 151-54 (1970) (describing how A-OK effectively 
entered the lexicon overnight as the American public heard an astronaut 
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changes typically occur. In particular, Part II.B explains how 
restriction—a narrowing shift in the meaning of a word from 
any member of a broad category to a prototypical member of 
that category—is the most common form of semantic shift. In 
Part III, the Article applies these findings to the trademark 
incapacity doctrine, refuting the functionality and error-cost 
rationales that are presumed to provide a basis for the 
doctrine. 
II. LANGUAGE CHANGE AND TRADEMARK MEANING 
Semantic shift is the creation of new meaning, either by 
adding new senses to existing words, or adding new words to 
the lexicon. Similarly, creation of the source significance 
necessary to qualify for trademark protection is a form of 
semantic shift. Like semantic shift generally, the creation of 
trademark meaning is driven by the need to communicate. And 
like semantic shift, trademark law provides rules for how to 
resolve confusing ambiguity. In both linguistic and legal 
realms, the effectiveness of the communication and the ease of 
processing the ambiguity depend largely on the nature of the 
relationship between a new word or meaning and the older 
word or words from which it is derived. 
Trademark acquisition also resembles semantic shift in 
another way. Semantic shift happens in regular patterns that 
linguists identify as occurring repeatedly over time and across 
languages. Each stop on the Abercrombie spectrum correlates 
with a category of semantic relationship, with one notable 
exception. Restriction of meaning occurs when the meaning of a 
word designating a category of things is narrowed to designate 
a prototypical member of the category.95 By many accounts, 
restriction is the most common form of semantic shift.96 But as 
discussed in Part I.B, trademark law treats the restrictive shift 
from a generic product category to a source-signifying 
trademark as forbidden, based in part on the mistaken premise 
that restriction in the trademark context is extremely rare. 
This Part presents evidence regarding the frequency of 
restriction and how restriction occurs. Part III then considers 
whether the justifications for trademark incapacity hold water 
in light of this evidence, and how we might change trademark 
law to more closely match our best understanding of how 
language actually changes. 
                                                                                                         
use it during a televised flight). 
95 See infra notes 145-146, 152-157 and accompanying text. 
96 See, e.g., GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS, supra note 16, at 26-27. 
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A.  Semantic Shift and the Abercrombie Spectrum 
Living languages are not static. The lexicon of a given 
language—the total number of words available to speakers of 
that language—must continually make room for new entries.97 
Two motivations drive this creation of new meaning, or 
semantic shift.98 First, semantic shift is motivated by the 
speaker’s need to say new things and communicate more 
effectively, which encourages the speaker to “risk” a semantic 
innovation.99 If the innovation fails, the attempt is dismissed as 
a “nonce-formation.”100 If the innovation spreads to other 
members of the speech community, it first becomes an 
“occasional” or context-specific meaning.101 Occasional or 
innovative uses that gain sufficient popularity may become 
context-independent, “usual” meanings.102 
Adding a new meaning to an old word is an efficient means 
of saying something new in a recognizable way. For instance, 
the torpedo, a self-propelled submarine explosive, was named 
for a type of stingray.103 Andreas Blank has proposed that the 
inventor called it a torpedo because he thought that “this was a 
pretty convincing metaphor” for the way the explosive device 
moved through the water and could surprise its target.104 
On the other hand, introducing new meanings to a given 
word can also cause confusing ambiguity.105 A listener or 
reader faced with conflicting meanings may find it difficult to 
                                                
97 See, for example, omnishambles, a new word coined in an episode of the 
British television satire In the Thick of It. Omnishambles, n., OXFORD 
DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/English 
/omnishambles (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (“n., British informal, a 
situation that has been comprehensively mismanaged, characterized by a 
string of blunders and miscalculations.”). 
98 Dirk Geeraerts, Reclassifying Semantic Change, 4 QUADERNI DI SEMANTICA 
217, 226, 234 (1983) [hereinafter Geeraerts, Reclassifying].  
99 Andreas Blank, Why Do New Meanings Occur? A Cognitive Typology of 
Motivations for Lexical Semantic Change, 61, 82-83 in HISTORICAL 
SEMANTICS AND COGNITION (Andreas Blank & Peter Koch eds., 1999) 
[hereinafter Blank, HISTORICAL SEMANTICS]; GEERAERTS,  LEXICAL 
SEMANTICS, supra note 16, at 14-16 (suggesting that individual behavior 
drives general language change over time) (citing HERMANN PAUL, 
PRINZIPIEN DER SPRACHGESCHICHTE (5th ed. 1920)). 
100 See Hollmann, supra note 17, at 535. 
101 WILLIAM CROFT, EXPLAINING LANGUAGE CHANGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY 
APPROACH 4-5, 105 (2000). 
102 Traugott and Dasher refer to occasional meanings as “subjectification[s],” 
which enter the lexicon as usual meanings once they are “fairly wide 
spread.” TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 2, at 32. 
103 Blank, supra note 99, at 62. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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understand the word. Ambiguity can thus increase the cost of 
communicating, and to that extent may be inefficient and 
undesirable.106 When such ambiguity arises, it can create what 
scholars call homonymic tension or semantic overload.107  
When confusing ambiguity arises, earlier meanings often 
disappear as newer meanings are added.108 For example, the 
Latin word persona gradually extended from “mask” to 
“individual human being,” and then branched off to “parish 
priest.” The resulting ambiguity was subsequently resolved by 
adopting the variant parson for “parish priest,” and 
abandoning persona for the same.109 Homonymic tension can 
thus force some meanings out of the lexicon.110 When old 
meanings disappear, ambiguity is reduced, making the 
language more efficient.111 
Semantic shift occurs in a variety of well-documented ways, 
enabling new expression and tempering confusing ambiguity. 
Sometimes a speaker makes up a whole new word. At 
inception, such a word is monosemous, having only one 
meaning.112 At other times, an existing word can be pressed 
into service for new purposes. Words gain and lose meaning in 
predictable patterns across languages,113 and these patterns 
may shape the acquisition of trademark meaning, which at its 
base is a type of semantic shift.114 Often, there is a relationship 
between the existing word and its new meanings. There are six 
standard categories of semantic change that build on existing 
meaning: restriction, widening, metaphoric polysemy, 
                                                
106 Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 98 at 227. 
107 STEPHEN ULLMANN, THE PRINCIPLES OF SEMANTICS: A LINGUISTIC APPROACH 
TO MEANING 132 (1951) (quoting LEONARD ROBERT PALMER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN LINGUISTICS 113 (1936)); Geeraerts, 
Reclassifying, supra note 98, at 226, 234. 
108 Robert J. Menner, Multiple Meaning and Change of Meaning, 21 
LANGUAGE 59, 61 (1945); see also id. at 67 (describing how the old French 
word nice, meaning “ignorant” or “simple,” morphed into two senses—(1) 
“fastidious,” “particular,” “refined,” which is also now nearly abandoned; 
and (2) “agreeable”). 
109 Joachim Grzega & Marion Schöner, English and General Historical 
Lexicology: Materials for Onomasiology Seminars, 1 ONOMASIOLOGY 
ONLINE MONOGRAPHS 1, 32 (2007). 
110 Robert J. Menner, The Conflict of Homonyms in English, 12 LANG. 229, 
234 (1936) [hereinafter Menner, Homonyms]; see also infra notes 167-170 
and accompanying text. 
111 ULLMANN, supra note 107, at 134 (language evolves “curative devices . . . 
to resolve ‘intolerable’ conflicts”). 
112 See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. 
113 TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 2, at 3. 
114 See infra notes 121-144 and accompanying text. 
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metonymous polysemy, amelioration, and pejoration.115 
Sometimes, new meanings are homonymous, or unrelated to 
old meanings.116 
Like semantic shift, trademark acquisition is speaker-
driven, exhibits regular behavior, and appears to be shaped by 
settled processing patterns used by listeners and readers when 
construing lexical ambiguity. Reconsider Blank’s description of 
how the torpedo was named.117 The motivation to find “a new 
name in a concrete situation”118 drives the efforts of the 
trademark owner to innovate. Each trademark is a symbol, 
indicating that goods or services sold under that mark will be 
of a consistent quality from a stable source.119 New meaning 
added to an existing word can point toward that source.120  
In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,121 the 
Second Circuit provided a spectrum of conceptual trademark 
strength based on the relationship between the new trademark 
and existing meanings of the appropriated word. As Judge 
Friendly articulated in Abercrombie, the more inherently 
distinctive a mark, the more readily it can bear source 
significance and the easier it is for the hopeful mark owner to 
acquire trademark protection.122  
Some trademarks are fanciful, created for the purpose of 
signifying products from a singular source, like XEROX for 
photocopiers. Other marks are formed from preexisting words. 
An arbitrary mark is formed when the word used is not related 
to the product identified, like APPLE for computers. Suggestive 
marks indirectly evoke some aspect of the product, like 
SKINVISIBLE for transparent adhesive bandages, while 
                                                
115 Elizabeth C. Traugott, Semantic Change: An Overview, in THE FIRST GLOT 
INTERNATIONAL STATE-OF-THE-ARTICLE BOOK: THE LATEST IN LINGUISTICS 
385 (Lisa Cheng & Rint Sybesma eds., 2000). I discuss the following types 
of semantic shift in more detail infra: restriction, notes 151-173 and 
accompanying text; widening, notes 174-180 and accompanying text; and 
metaphoric and metonymous polysemy, notes 132-141 and accompanying 
text. For a more detailed discussion of what metaphoric and metonymous 
polysemy can teach us about the acquisition of secondary meaning in 
suggestive and descriptive trademarks, see generally Linford, False 
Dichotomy, supra note 7. 
116 See infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. 
118 Blank, HISTORICAL SEMANTICS, supra note 99, at 62. 
119 Beebe, Semiotic, supra note 1, at 623. 
120 Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 563 (2006) [hereinafter Bone, 
Goodwill]. 
121 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
122 Id. at 9. 
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descriptive marks, like SEALTIGHT for fasteners, are derived 
from a quality or feature of the identified good or service. 
Although the Abercrombie spectrum has been criticized as an 
acontextual distraction from the key inquiries in trademark 
law,123 the spectrum nevertheless plays a critical role in 
trademark law’s inquiry into source significance. 
As the following chart highlights, key points along the 
Abercrombie spectrum mirror commonly understood forms of 
semantic shift—for the most part.124 The sole outlier is the 
treatment of a generic term in trademark law. While 
restriction—the shift from a general to a narrow meaning—
occurs frequently and across languages, the restriction in 
consumer perception when a word like “hog” shifts from 
product type to product source is given no legal effect. 
Semantic Category 
(relationship between 
existing words/meanings 
and new word/meaning) 
Abercrombie Spectrum 
(relationship between mark 
and product or good offered) 
Monoseme: only one 
meaning. 
Fanciful mark: coined for 
use as a trademark, not 
derived from a preexisting 
word.  
Ex: XEROX for photocopiers. 
Homonym: no connection 
between existing meanings 
and the new meaning. 
Arbitrary mark: derived 
from a pre-existing word 
that has no connection with 
the good or service sold.  
Ex: APPLE for computers. 
                                                
123 See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 1, at 1078 (“[T]he Abercrombie 
classification system is built on a faulty theoretical notion that semantic 
meaning is the determinant of the extent to which consumers will esteem 
a mark to be a source-indicator.”). But see Linford, False Dichotomy, supra 
note 7, at 24-25. 
124 In addition, research by Barton Beebe suggests that the mark’s place on 
the Abercrombie spectrum correlates with the eventual outcome in 
litigation. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for 
Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1635-39 (2006) 
[hereinafter Beebe, Multifactor]. 
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Metaphor: figurative 
connection between 
existing meanings and the 
new sense. 
Suggestive mark: pre-
existing word with some 
connection to the mark, via 
an imaginative leap.  
Ex: SKINVISIBLE for 
transparent adhesive 
bandages; GLEEM for 
toothpaste. 
Metonym: some connection 
between existing and new 
sense, like feature for the 
whole.  
Ex: Green Beret from 
distinctive headgear worn 
by U.S. Army Special 
Forces shifts to serve as a 
nickname for the 
organization and its 
members. 
Descriptive mark: pre-
existing term with a clear 
connection to the good or 
service sold, via a direct 
description of a product 
feature.  
Ex: SEALTIGHT for 
fasteners. 
Restriction: word formerly 
used to describe general 
category narrowed to 
represent a prototypical 
member of the category. 
Ex ante generic mark: word 
whose meaning has shifted 
from a class of products to 
one particular brand. 
Not an example: HOG for 
Harley Davidson 
motorcycles denied 
protection, despite evidence 
of shift, on grounds of 
trademark incapacity. 
A fanciful mark, like XEROX for photocopiers,125 is a 
monoseme—a word with a singular meaning.126 Before XEROX 
                                                
125 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978). The term 
XEROX is ostensibly drawn from the technical name for the photocopying 
process, xerography, which itself is derived from Greek words for “dry” 
and “writing,” ξηρό εγγράφως. Earle Hitchner, Xerox Is Not a Verb, in 
PROPHETS IN THE DARK: HOW XEROX REINVENTED ITSELF AND BEAT BACK 
THE JAPANESE 431, 431 (1992).  
126 Monosemy is the condition where a word or phrase has a single meaning, 
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was coined as a name for photocopying machines, that 
combination of letters had no meaning. On the Abercrombie 
scale, a fanciful mark is considered the most inherently 
distinctive trademark. It is easy for consumers to perceive the 
mark as a source signifier because the fanciful mark has no 
prior relationship to the product identified. 
An arbitrary mark, like APPLE for computers,127 has a 
homonymous relationship to the word appropriated as a source 
signifier. Homonyms are words that look and/or sound the 
same,128 but have multiple unrelated meanings.129 For example, 
while the word bank can refer to a financial institution or the 
bank of a river, each meaning is homonymous, stemming from 
independent sources.130 Historical and cognitive research 
                                                                                                         
or where there is an absence of ambiguity. CHARLES RUHL, ON MONOSEMY: 
A STUDY IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS (1989). A monoseme has a singular, and 
often technical meaning. Monosemic, adj.2, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/253725 (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (“Of a 
word: having only one meaning”); cf. Mononym, n., OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/238541 (last visited Nov. 7, 
2014) (“A technical name consisting of one word only.”). The term 
monoseme came into common usage to describe technical medical terms at 
the turn of the twentieth century. Scholars have also applied the term to 
certain prominent trademarks or trade names. For example, David 
Crystal offers MICROSOFT as an example of a monosemous term. DAVID 
CRYSTAL, HOW LANGUAGE WORKS 191 (2005). 
127 OWEN W. LINZMAYER, APPLE CONFIDENTIAL: THE REAL STORY OF APPLE 
COMPUTER, INC. (1999); Stephen Wozniak, Homebrew and How the Apple 
Came to Be, in DIGITAL DELI (Steve Ditlea ed., 1984); see also Trademark 
Reg. No. 1,078,312 (Nov. 29, 1977) (APPLE for computers and computer 
programs recorded on paper and tape). 
128 For the sake of simplicity, I include within homonymy both homophones, 
words that sound the same but have different written forms and different 
meanings, and homographs, words with the same written form but 
different pronunciations and meanings; see generally Ekaterina 
Klepousniotou, The Processing of Lexical Ambiguity: Homonymy and 
Polysemy in the Mental Lexicon, 81 BRAIN & LANGUAGE 205 (2001). 
129 Keith Allan defines homonymy as “the relation between two or more 
expressions which have the same form but different meanings.” 1 KEITH 
ALLAN, LINGUISTIC MEANING 147 (1986). Grzega and Schöner identify 
several reasons for such a change: speakers drop sounds at the end of 
words, or certain sounds are abandoned from language over time, causing 
previously distinguishable words to become indistinguishable. Grzega & 
Schöner, supra note 109, at 32. 
130 Bank as an institution derives from the Italian term for bench. Bank, n.3, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15237 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2014); see also infra note 133 and accompanying text. The 
meaning of bank as the side of a river, or other raised shelf of ground, on 
the other hand, is of Scandinavian origin. Bank, n.1, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15235 (last visited Nov. 7, 
2014). The two terms collapsed into the same word, banke, in early 
modern English. Id. 
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suggests that readers and listeners process unrelated or 
homonymous meanings as if they were completely different 
words.131 In the trademark context, adopting an arbitrary mark 
is not accidental. For example, Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak 
selected APPLE as a source signifier for the personal 
computers they built. But the absence of a relationship 
between the mark and the goods or services makes the 
arbitrary trademark more clearly distinctive than trademarks 
more intimately connected to the offered good or service.  
Unlike the coining of monosemes, or homonymous shift, 
some semantic shift creates a new meaning that is closely 
related, or polysemous to existing meanings.132 Linguists posit 
that polysemes are interrelated in such a way that the reader 
or listener derives multiple meanings from a single or central 
sense.133 Polysemous senses are etymologically related, 
stemming from a common source. To take an earlier example in 
a different direction, the word bank means a financial 
institution, the building in which the financial institution is 
housed, any number of institutions that store things (like a 
blood bank), and a synonym for “to rely upon,” for example, 
“you can bank on it.”134 All those meanings derived from the 
Italian term for bench, which was “extended in Italian to mean, 
alternately, ‘tradesman’s stall, counter, money changer’s table’” 
and more.135 
Polysemous shifts are of two regular types: metonymic (for 
example, Green Beret, the distinctive headgear of the United 
States Army Special Forces extended to a nickname for the 
                                                
131 WILLIAM CROFT & D. ALAN CRUSE, COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 112 (2004) 
(suggesting that it is difficult, but not impossible, to simultaneously 
construe an ambiguous word using two homonymous meanings); 
Ekaterina Klepousniotou, Reconciling Linguistics and Psycholinguistics: 
On the Psychological Reality of Linguistic Polysemy, in THE COGNITIVE 
BASIS OF POLYSEMY: NEW SOURCES OF EVIDENCE FOR THEORIES OF WORD 
MEANING 29 (Rakova et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Klepousniotou, 
Reconciling]; Ekaterina Klepousniotou & Shari R. Baum, Disambiguating 
the Ambiguity Advantage Effect in Word Recognition: An Advantage for 
Polysemous but Not Homonymous Words, 20 J. NEUROLINGUISTICS 1, 4 
(2007) [hereinafter Klepousniotou & Baum, Disambiguating] (explaining 
that homonyms have mutually exclusive meanings, one of which must be 
selected before further processing can occur). 
132 Allan defines polysemy as “the property of an expression with more than 
one meaning.” 1 ALLAN, supra note 129, at 147. 
133 Klepousniotou & Baum, Disambiguating, supra note 131, at 4 (explaining 
that polysemes have a single core meaning from which interrelated senses 
are derived). 
134 CROFT & CRUSE, supra note 131, at 109-110. 
135 Bank, n.3, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry 
/15237 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).  
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organization and its members),136 and metaphoric (for example, 
lip for “part of the body around the mouth” extended to “edge of 
a cup”).137 In both cases, the speaker perceives some similarity 
between two concepts, and uses the word for the first concept to 
refer to the second. 
Descriptive and suggestive marks are both polysemous with 
the goods or services identified. Descriptive marks are related 
to the word or words from which they are drawn in a manner 
that resembles metonymic polysemy. A descriptive mark builds 
on a characteristic of the good or service offered, while a 
metonymic shift is a change based on contiguity between 
concepts.138 For example, a term like SEALTIGHT for fasteners 
describes the qualities a fastener would likely have and is thus 
descriptive in nature. 
The creation of a suggestive mark mirrors metaphoric 
polysemy. Suggestive marks operate in metaphoric relationship 
to the words from which they are drawn,139 requiring “the 
consumer to exercise his imagination to reach a conclusion as 
to the nature of the . . . goods” offered under that mark.140 For 
example, SKINVISIBLE for transparent bandages is a 
portmanteau that conveys a characteristic of the product—
transparency—but in a way that hints at, rather than 
expressly states, the connection.141 
                                                
136 D. GARY MILLER, ENGLISH LEXICOGENESIS 111 (2014) (offering several 
examples of metonymic polysemy, such as the use of redcoat for British 
military officer and skirt for a woman). 
137 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 131, at 27.  
138 See TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 2, at 28. For instance, horn for 
“animal horn” added the sense of horn for “musical instrument,” due to 
the use of some animal horns as musical instruments or warning devices. 
Andreas Blank, Co-Presence and Succession: A Cognitive Typology of 
Metonymy, in METONYMY IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 169, 182 (Klaus-Uwe 
Panther & Günter Radden eds., 1999). 
139 Metaphoric extensions are based on a specific analogous similarity 
between concepts. GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS, supra note 16, at 27. 
For instance, broadcast originally meant to “scatter[ seed] abroad over the 
whole surface, instead of . . . sow[ing] in drills or rows,” then to “scatter[ 
something] widely abroad,” and later came to mean “[d]isseminate[] by 
means of radio or television.” Broadcast, v. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/23507 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
140 Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1528 (4th Cir. 
1984); see also U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL 
OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1209.01(a) (2014) (“Suggestive marks . . . 
when applied to the goods or services at issue, require imagination, 
thought, or perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of those 
goods or services . . . . [But a] descriptive term . . . immediately tells 
something about the goods or services.”). 
141 Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179, 1180 
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As with the processing of different types of semantic 
innovation, trademarks qualify for protection based on the 
relationship between the mark and the offered good or service. 
Fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks are treated as 
inherently distinctive, qualifying for trademark protection from 
first use. While suggestive marks are classified as inherently 
distinctive, some courts consider a suggestive mark to be 
weaker than arbitrary or fanciful marks and thus entitled to 
narrower protection from alleged infringement.142 A descriptive 
mark is protectable only after source significance is 
established.143  
At a rough cut, the different treatment of fanciful, 
arbitrary, suggestive, and descriptive marks is defensible in 
light of how listeners and readers process confusing ambiguity. 
It is easy for consumers to view a fanciful mark as a source 
signifier because the lack of relationship between the mark and 
any other word will lead the consumer to perceive the word as 
a trademark. Likewise, the lack of connection between the 
arbitrary mark and the good or service offered will be perceived 
by consumers as distinct lexical entries, i.e., two clearly distinct 
things that share superficial similarities in visual or audible 
element. Likewise, suggestive and descriptive marks are 
closely connected with the good or service sold. If trademark 
protection turns on consumer perception, the mark owner 
should be required to build up secondary meaning or 
commercial strength before the law protects a descriptive or 
suggestive term from trademark infringement.144 
                                                                                                         
(C.C.P.A. 1972) (reversing decision of the TTAB which sustained an 
opposition to the application to register SKINVISIBLE on ground of mere 
descriptiveness under § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act). 
142 Compare M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (concluding that suggestive marks, like descriptive marks, are 
“conceptually weak”), with Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 
1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (concluding that suggestive marks are considered 
“strong” as well as “presumptively valid”), Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. 
SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the 
mark of the smaller junior user was inherently distinctive and thus 
deserved “broad protection”), and Beebe, Multifactor, supra note 124, at 
1637-38 (analyzing likelihood of confusion cases and reporting that courts 
concluded a suggestive mark was strong in just under 59 percent of cases, 
but concluded that an arbitrary mark was strong in over 68 percent of 
cases, and that a fanciful mark was strong in every reported case). 
143 Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(“Secondary meaning need only be shown if a mark . . . is found to be or is 
conceded to be descriptive.”). 
144 For a more complete consideration from a linguistic standpoint of whether 
suggestive and descriptive marks should be treated differently, see 
Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 7. 
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On the other hand, trademark incapacity is not defensible 
in light of our best understanding of how people process 
linguistic ambiguity and language change. While trademark 
acquisition is a subset of the broader phenomenon of semantic 
shift, the doctrine of trademark incapacity discounts 
restriction, which may be the most common form of semantic 
shift. The next Section explains the phenomenon of restriction 
in more detail. 
B. Regularity of Restriction in Semantic Shift 
Semantic shift occurs in regular patterns. This Section 
considers two well-recognized patterns, restriction and 
widening, and what they can teach us about consumer 
perception and consumer confusion. Restriction is narrowing in 
meaning from a broad category to a prototypical member of 
that category.145 For example, queen once meant “wife” or 
“woman,” but the meaning has narrowed to “king’s wife” or 
“female sovereign.”146 Widening happens when the name of a 
thing comes to represent the category to which the thing 
belongs.147 For instance, the French arriver originally meant 
“to reach the river bank,” but has broadened to mean “to reach 
a destination.”148 Restriction and widening are both examples 
of semantic change that occurs because of a focus by speakers 
and listeners on a prototypical member of a group. A significant 
amount of semantic shift is driven by the focus on a 
prototypical example of a given category.149 Thus, some 
scholars identify restriction and widening as the most 
important processes of semantic change.150 
Michel Bréal, one of the founders of semantic linguistics, 
first posited that restriction is the most frequently occurring 
regular semantic shift.151 Historical accounts support this 
                                                
145 Restriction is also called narrowing or specification. GEERAERTS, LEXICAL 
SEMANTICS, supra note 16, at 27. 
146 Id. 
147 Widening is also called generalization or broadening. Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Blank, supra note 99, at 62-63. 
150 See MICHEL BRÉAL, SEMANTICS: STUDIES IN THE SCIENCE OF MEANING 189 
(Cust trans., 1964) (“[T]he facts of restriction are of the most frequent 
occurrence.”); GERT RONBERG, A WAY WITH WORDS: THE LANGUAGE OF 
ENGLISH RENAISSANCE LITERATURE 32 (1992); see also Francisco Yus, 
Relevance Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTICS 679, 693 
(Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog eds., 2012) (arguing that the creation of 
metaphors often involves “both broadening and narrowing of concepts”). 
151 BRÉAL, supra note 150, at 106; see also MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 178-
79 (explaining that restriction is the most natural form of language 
change, particularly when a loan word is introduced, and the old word 
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theory. For example, the shift from Old English to Middle 
English is replete with instances of semantic restriction and 
loss of Old English vocabulary.152 Much of that restriction 
occurred as new “loanwords” were introduced from other 
languages, and the meanings of both old and new terms were 
narrowed as they came into conflict. For instance, while the 
Old English word goma once referred broadly to “jaw, palate, 
and inside of the mouth,” the introduction of palate from the 
Latin and jaw from an unidentified source coincides with a 
restriction of goma, or gum, to refer only to the connective 
tissue surrounding the teeth.153 Cultural and technological 
change also explains some semantic shift, as words are lost due 
to irrelevance. For example, no one walks around with a body 
of retainers anymore, so a word like folgoÞ—the Old English 
word for “a body of retainers” —has been rendered obsolete.154 
Often, a term designating a whole category is narrowed or 
restricted to a prototypical member of the category.155 For 
example, meat once meant “food,” but has narrowed to “edible 
flesh.”156 The shift of a generic term to a trademark—like the 
shift from understanding hog to mean any large motorcycle to 
specifically Harley Davidson motorcycles—is another example 
of restriction.157  
There are multiple examples through history of semantic 
restriction from the whole category to a prototypical member. 
For example, corn stems from the Latin word for grain. In a 
given locale, the term will adopt a usual meaning 
corresponding to the dominant crop in the region. Corn is thus 
narrowed in the United States to mean maize, while in most of 
England, corn refers to what U.S. consumers would call wheat, 
and in northern England and Ireland, corn identifies what U.S. 
residents call oats.158 Other examples include skyline 
                                                                                                         
must “recoil” to stay relevant); ROBERT P. STOCKWELL & DONKA MINKOVA, 
ENGLISH WORDS: HISTORY AND STRUCTURE 158 (2001) (arguing that 
restriction is an unnatural change but conceding that restriction happens 
“quite frequently” in some contexts). 
152 C.M. MILLWARD & MARY HAYES, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
205 (3d ed. 2012) (“The type of semantic change easiest to find between 
OE and ME (and during ME) is narrowing of meaning . . . . [M]any OE 
words acquired narrower, more specific meanings in ME as a direct result 
of loans from other languages.”). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 203. 
155 BRÉAL, supra note 150, at 106. 
156 LEONARD BLOOMFIELD, LANGUAGE 426 (1933).  
157 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
158 Corn, n.1, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY at II.3.a, http://www.oed.com/view 
/Entry/41586 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
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narrowing from any horizon to a horizon decorated by 
skyscrapers;159 and wife narrowing from any woman of humble 
rank or low employment to married woman or spouse.160 The 
Old English steorfan, meaning “to die,” narrowed in Modern 
English to starve, meaning “to die of hunger.”161 Art originally 
had general meanings connected to “skill,” “technique,” or 
“craft,” but is now primarily related to aesthetic skill in a fine 
art.162 At the time the Constitution was drafted, science broadly 
referred to knowledge or learning, but has narrowed today to 
refer to the investigation of natural phenomena through 
observation and experimentation.163 Accident has narrowed 
from any unforeseen event to an unfortunate one.164 Fowl in 
Old English referred to any bird, but narrowed to a 
domesticated bird raised for food or a wild hunted for sport.165 
The meaning of girl narrowed from “child or young person of 
either sex” in Middle English to “female child” or “young 
woman.”166 
It is not unusual for two or more ambiguous meanings to 
coexist for a time before one of the meanings is forced out.167 
Restriction does not necessarily force old meanings out of the 
lexicon entirely. But even when a meaning is not forced out, 
semantic overload is resolved as words abandon potentially 
conflicting meanings or are otherwise narrowed. For example, 
since light (from Old English, meaning “bright,” “brilliant,” “or 
“shining”) and light (from German, the antonym of heavy) 
coexist in English, it is difficult to use a phrase like “light 
materials” without resorting to a compound such as “light 
                                                
159 VICTORIA FROMKIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 361 (10th ed. 
2013).  
160 GEORGE YULE, THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE 233 (4th ed. 2010).  
161 MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 177-78. 
162 CRYSTAL, supra note 126, at 224-30; Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the 
Information Age, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1419, 1425 (1999). 
163 Durham, supra note 162, at 1425 (“A reference to Dr. Johnson’s definition 
of ‘scientifick’ will show . . . that the natural science which the present 
connotation of the word calls to mind was, in the days when the 
Constitution was written, referred to as ‘natural philosophy.’”) (quoting 
Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 396-
97 (1960)). 
164 FRANCIS KATAMBA, ENGLISH WORDS: STRUCTURE, HISTORY, USAGE 175 
(2004). 
165 Id. 
166 Hollmann, supra note 17, at 304. 
167 See, e.g., TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 2, at 12; see also 2 JOHN LYONS, 
SEMANTICS § 10.4, at 397 (explaining that the context in which an 
ambiguous word is presented can be “such that all but one of the possible 
interpretations are irrelevant or relatively improbable”). 
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weight.”168 Likewise, sand in Old English meant both the strip 
of land next to a body of water and the particulate matter 
common to that land. When the German word shore was 
borrowed to refer to the body of land, sand was narrowed to 
mean only the granular particles.169 The semantic overload 
created by the ambiguity resulted in the narrowing of both 
terms.170  
In addition, restriction increases the amount of information 
conveyed by the restricted form of a word, compared to the 
broader form. As the meaning restricts, the term can be applied 
more precisely and requires less contextual processing.171 Thus, 
a restricted term communicates more efficiently. Think back to 
the restriction of hound from designating any dog to 
designating a long-eared hunting dog.172 If I tell you that I’ve 
lost my dog, you might ask me what type of dog he is before 
trying to find him. When hound meant any dog, it did not 
convey much information about the breed of dog in question. 
However, when the meaning of hound was restricted to large 
dogs used for hunting, the word conveyed more information to 
the listener. Compare this to the way a child first learning 
English may use a word like “dog” to represent any four-legged 
mammal.173 The more general the word, the less information it 
conveys. 
Restriction has its opposite. A term designating the 
prototypical member of a category may be widened or 
generalized to represent the whole category.174 For example, 
dog used to refer to specific large or strong breeds of 
domesticated canines (and still does in Danish), but has since 
been broadened to include any domesticated canine regardless 
of size.175 Widening happens frequently, but less often than 
restriction.176 
                                                
168 TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 2, at 12; see also Menner, Homonyms, 
supra note 110, at 241-42. 
169 C.M. MILLWARD & MARY HAYES, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
205 (3d ed. 2012).  
170 As discussed in another article, this same effect can arise in cases where 
confusing use is tolerated in the trademark context. See Jake Linford, 
Trademark Infringement as Semantic Shift (2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
171 MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 178 (“[A] restricted form is applicable to 
fewer situations but tells us more about each one.”). 
172 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
173 ALLAN, supra note 129, at 103. 
174 BRÉAL, supra note 150, at 115-21; GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS, supra 
note 16, at 26-27.  
175 Hollmann, supra note 17, at 304. 
176 See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text. 
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Semantic shift is a natural phenomenon, but in the 
trademark context, it is also a phenomenon with legal 
consequences. When a trademarked term is widened to 
represent the product category as a whole, the mark owner can 
lose protection in the mark.177  For example, KLEENEX, the 
“proprietary name of an absorbent disposable cleansing paper 
tissue,”178 has ostensibly broadened over time to add a second 
polysemous meaning as a designation for “any disposable 
cleansing paper tissue, regardless of brand.”179 Likewise, the 
CELLOPHANE mark lost source significance when a court 
concluded the mark had primarily become a generic 
designation for a transparent sheet of semi-viscous paper ideal 
for preserving food.180 Consumers who continue to rely on the 
source significance of a mark that undergoes generislide will be 
confused,181 but consumers who have adopted the broader 
meaning might welcome cheaper competition by a free-riding 
new entrant who uses the former trademark to identify 
competing products or services.182  
Likewise, if a generic term acquires source-significance and 
is recognized as a trademark, as this Article supports,183 
competitors who plan to use the term to designate their own 
products will find a mark owner backed with legal authority to 
secure injunctive relief and/or damages against the 
competitor’s confusing use. Consumer and competitor 
investment in the restricted generic term will be the inverse of 
interest in the widened trademark. Consumers who would not 
be confused by the competition may pay more for the products 
                                                
177 See infra notes 201-207 and accompanying text; see also Jake Linford, 
Generislide and Trademark’s Other Slippery Slopes (2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Linford, Generislide]. 
178 Kleenex, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry 
/103818 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
179 ROBERT J. JEFFERS & ILSE LEHISTE, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOR 
HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS 129 (1979); see also Heymann, supra note 1. 
180 Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 6 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 
1934). 
181 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting 
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1241 (2007) 
(noting that doctrines like abandonment “present ‘hard cases’ precisely 
because there are search cost rationales on both sides of the argument,” 
and recognizing that, from an economically grounded “search costs 
perspective, the automatic preference given to one group of consumers 
over another can be troubling”) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Search-
Costs Theory]. 
182 See generally Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet 
Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005); Michael Grynberg, Trademark 
Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 (2008). 
183 See infra Part III.B. 
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they desire because trademark protection can increase costs for 
competitors, but consumers who have adopted the narrowed 
meaning will have lower search costs to find the products they 
desire. 
As discussed in Part I.B, the doctrine of trademark 
incapacity currently denies legal significance to semantic 
restriction when the term that acquires secondary meaning 
was once a generic product designation. The doctrine is out of 
step with the best current understanding of how semantic shift 
occurs and how language users manage confusing ambiguity. 
Part III refutes the standard justifications for trademark 
incapacity, then proposes an alternative doctrinal approach to 
bring trademark law in line with our best evidence about how 
consumers process restriction. 
III. TRADEMARK (IN)CAPACITY AND THE MYTH OF SHIFT-
RESISTANT TERMS 
If trademark law aims to optimize consumer search costs 
and minimize consumer confusion, then the law should reflect 
how consumers will likely process the semantic change that 
occurs when trademark meaning is created. The treatment of 
generic marks under the doctrine of trademark incapacity is at 
cross-purposes with these aims. The process by which a generic 
trademark gains source significance is a form of restriction, 
and ignoring restriction—and the consumer perception of 
source significance that comes with it—may well increase error 
in trademark litigation. Competition justifications for 
trademark incapacity likewise fall short precisely because they 
purport to divorce competition concerns from consumer 
confusion, even though consumer confusion is the sine qua non 
of trademark infringement.  
Because trademark law should accurately reflect consumer 
concerns and reduce consumer search costs, we should embrace 
a doctrine that better reflects regular semantic shift. 
Trademark law should thus abandon the incapacity doctrine. 
This Article argues instead for applying a primary significance 
standard for the acquisition of trademark protection. Under the 
primary significance standard, a term for which the primary 
meaning is a source-signifying trademark should receive 
federal trademark protection, regardless of whether the term 
was once a generic designation. 
A. Recognizing Trademark’s Capacities 
Parts I.B and I.C described the current function of the 
trademark incapacity doctrine as it currently operates, and 
outlined several proposed justifications for the doctrine. This 
Section now turns to the argument, grounded in the semantic 
shift literature, for why the law should abandon the trademark 
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incapacity doctrine in favor of recognizing the capacity of any 
term to serve as a trademark where the appropriate semantic 
shift has in fact occurred.  
First, it is important to separate questions of trademark 
incapacity from the general inquiry that a fact finder must 
make into whether a mark is source-signifying. If a term is 
currently generic, the term does not merit trademark protection 
because there is insufficient source significance and therefore 
no trademark right to enforce. Trademark incapacity, however, 
adds another layer to the inquiry by requiring the fact finder to 
determine whether the term was ever a generic designation for 
the product category, often ignoring current source 
significance. Thus, in Grottanelli, the court granted greater 
weight to a dictionary definition stating that hog was once used 
to designate any big motorcycle, than to evidence that 98 
percent of surveyed consumers associated the term hog with 
Harley Davidson motorcycles.184  
What harm requires this linguistic grave-digging? This 
second level of inquiry requires justification above and beyond 
the obvious harm of granting trademark protection to a term 
the majority of consumers see as a generic product designation. 
If there is no separate justification, then we should simply 
handle the analysis as we do for descriptive marks, and look for 
secondary meaning as measured by consumer perception, 
claimant’s efforts, and other relevant proxies. Part III.A.1 
describes and refutes an error-cost justification for trademark 
incapacity. Part III.A.2 then considers and rebuts justifications 
for trademark incapacity grounded in competition policy.  
1. Refuting the Error-cost Justification for 
Trademark Incapacity 
Some courts and scholars argue that trademark incapacity 
is justified because it reduces administrative and error costs,185 
but ignoring semantic restriction may well increase error and 
consumer confusion. Trademark law has, to date, artificially 
hampered recognition of semantic restriction when it occurs. 
This limitation may impose real costs on consumers, costs that 
trademark law ostensibly seeks to alleviate.  
Enforcement costs come in two general varieties: 
administrative costs—the cost of getting an answer, and error 
costs—the costs imposed on litigants and society if a court 
                                                
184 Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999); see 
supra note 48-49 and accompanying text. 
185 See generally Bone, Enforcement Costs, supra note 70.  
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reaches the wrong result.186 In the trademark incapacity 
context, both the administrative and error cost analyses turn in 
part on the relative frequency with which we should expect 
restricting shifts.187 Courts and scholars articulating the 
doctrine of trademark incapacity often posit that generic terms 
generally do not acquire source-signifying meaning,188 treating 
the few cases where courts have recognized the shift, like 
Singer or Goodyear, as outliers.189 Consider again the 
COMPUTER trademark hypothetical discussed in Part I. 
Trademark rights in COMPUTER for an information 
processing device appear problematic because we are in the 
midst of an era where it seems that nearly everyone in the 
United States owns or has access to a computer. If the majority 
of trademark incapacity cases were like this hypothetical case, 
one might conclude that a shift in meaning from a generic 
product designation to source signifier is so unlikely that we 
should avoid the administrative cost of finding out whether it 
ever happens. Trademark incapacity’s static view of language 
seems sensible at that extreme end of the scale. 
But if, as Part II describes, meaning in language is subject 
to persistent, if not continual change,190 one might be puzzled 
by how trademark law handles generic terms. In particular, 
the doctrine of trademark incapacity may generate error 
because it turns on a misapprehension about how frequently 
semantic restriction occurs. A shift from a generic product 
designation to a source-signifying trademark is a prototypical 
                                                
186 See id. at 2123 (“In general, there are two types of enforcement cost: 
administrative (or process) costs and error costs.”). 
187 Id. 
188 See, e.g., In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“[G]eneric terms by definition are incapable of indicating source.”); In re 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (“Generic terms, by definition incapable of indicating source, 
are the antithesis of trademarks, and can never attain trademark 
status.”). Occasionally, courts have phrased the trademark incapacity 
doctrine in a manner that might leave room for a source-significance-
acquiring semantic shift. See, e.g., H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of 
Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“A generic term is the 
common descriptive name of a class of goods or services, and, while it 
remains such common descriptive name, it can never be registered as a 
trademark because such a term is ‘merely descriptive’ within the meaning 
of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act and is incapable of acquiring de jure 
distinctiveness under § 2(f) of the Lanham Act.”) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
189 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
190 See Anne Curzan, What Makes a Word Real?, TED (Mar. 2014), http://www 
.ted.com/talks/anne_curzan_what_makes_a_word_real (describing the speak 
-er’s practice of delaying the start of her college English class each day 
until students share two new words). 
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example of restrictive change, and restriction is, by some 
accounts, the most common form of semantic shift.191 Even if 
restriction were no more common than any other form of 
semantic shift,192 there is no reason from a linguistic 
standpoint to think a generic term cannot change to primarily 
designate a single source for a good, or that consumers cannot 
process the restriction. The current trademark regime may 
introduce error by pretending that restriction cannot happen or 
happens so rarely that it should be ignored. In addition, the 
doctrine encourages courts to engage in faulty 
compartmentalization of compound marks (as with 
HOTELS.COM, CHOCOLATE FUDGE SODA or 
TURBODIESEL).193 The trademark incapacity doctrine is thus 
an unfortunate static outlier in an otherwise dynamic 
trademark system. 
Trademark incapacity might nevertheless be justified if the 
harm from a false positive (the shift has not occurred, but the 
court concludes the mark can be protected) is greater than the 
harm from a false negative (the shift has occurred, but the 
court concludes the mark cannot be protected).194 Denying 
protection under the doctrine may thus turn on a perceived 
imbalance in error costs. Some have suggested that allowing a 
generic term to acquire source significance will increase 
consumer search costs.195 For example, if one seller is granted 
trademark rights in COMPUTER for personal information 
processing devices, other sellers might struggle to find another 
word that adequately identifies competing products to 
consumers. Consumers might find only one type of computer 
and miss a product they would prefer to buy because the 
trademark rights of the company selling computers under the 
COMPUTER trademark prohibits competitors from using the 
term “computer” to sell them.  
This apprehension drove the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.196 There, the Court 
contemplated the competitive impact of granting National 
Biscuit an exclusive right to use the term “Shredded Wheat” 
                                                
191 See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text. 
192 See STOCKWELL & MINKOVA, supra note 151, at 158. 
193 See supra notes 50-52, 55-57, and accompanying text. 
194 Cf. Joseph Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 175 
(describing how in close cases, courts should put a thumb on the scale 
against interpreting intellectual property provisions broadly because the 
cost of a false positive is higher than the cost of a false negative). 
195 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
196 305 U.S. 111 (1938). I will return to Kellogg in the discussion of 
functionality and trademark incapacity in Part III.A.2(3). 
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when that was the term by which consumers had come to 
identify the product sold by both parties.197 Denying Kellogg 
the right to refer to the product by name would have limited its 
ability to communicate with interested consumers. This could 
result in an increased price for the “official” shredded wheat 
product line as competitors are required to find a different, but 
sufficiently similar name by which to identify their competing 
products.  
While courts have posited that protecting generic terms 
increases consumer search costs because it prevents 
competitors from providing consumers with information they 
need about the products offered,198 that is the case only so long 
as the term is currently perceived by a critical mass of 
consumers as generic. In a counterfactual world where the 
majority of consumers see shredded wheat not as a product 
category but instead as a trademark, the consumer search cost 
rationale does not support trademark incapacity.199 The 
purported imposition on consumers has little to do with 
whether the term was once generic or merely descriptive.200  
The consumer search cost problem in the trademark 
incapacity context can be better understood by considering how 
a trademark loses protection. A mark can lose protection if it 
ceases to serve as a source signifier.201 Trademark law applies 
a primary significance or “majority wins” standard to 
determine when a shift in consumer perception changes a 
protectable source signifier into an unprotectable product 
designation.202 Courts do not ask whether every consumer sees 
                                                
197 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118. 
198 See, e.g., Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 14 
(1st Cir. 2008) (“[I]n accord with the primary justifications for protecting 
trademarks—to aid competition and lower consumers’ search costs—the 
law does not grant any party exclusive rights to use generic terms as 
trademarks.”). 
199 Scholars engaging in economic analyses of trademark law argue the 
trademark incapacity doctrine is likely inefficient. See, e.g., Bone, 
Enforcement Costs, supra note 70, at 2124; Desai & Rierson, supra note 
64, at 1832-33. But see Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the 
First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003) (arguing on First 
Amendment grounds that even descriptive marks do not merit trademark 
protection). 
200 Cf. Goldman, supra note 182 (describing multiple constituency problems 
in the internet search context); Grynberg, supra note 182 (arguing that 
defendants in trademark litigation may serve as proxies for consumers 
who are not confused by, and may prefer the information conveyed by, the 
allegedly confusing use). 
201 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2) (L.A. § 45). 
202 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (L.A. § 45) (“A mark shall be deemed ‘abandoned’ . . . 
[w]hen any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as 
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the mark as generic. Rather, courts considering a claim of ex 
post genericness look for evidence that a majority of the 
relevant consumer base now uses the mark as a generic 
product designation. Once a majority of consumers see the 
mark as generic, it no longer qualifies for trademark 
protection.203 Many marks have lost trademark protection in 
the United States, including aspirin, cellophane, and 
escalator.204 
The slide out of protection (which elsewhere I have called 
“generislide”)205 is justified on the ground that the majority of 
consumers see the term primarily as a product designator, even 
though some consumers will find it more difficult to locate the 
product they want if, for example, they think of aspirin as a 
designation for a pain reliever from a particular source. Stacy 
Dogan and Mark Lemley have noted the law is willing to 
“sacrifice” the interests of consumers who still see a mark as 
source-signifying “as soon as a critical mass of consumers 
treats the term as generic,”206 because “the harm to consumers 
who associate the term with the entire class of goods outweighs 
the harm to the diminishing number who view it only as a 
mark.”207 Under a search-cost rationale, the mark should fall 
into genericness so that competitors can sell their own “aspirin” 
under another mark.  
The same search-cost rationale should shape the outcome 
when a majority of consumers see a formerly or potentially 
generic term primarily as a source-signifying trademark. 
                                                                                                         
well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the 
goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to 
lose its significance as a mark.”); see also Big Island Candies, Inc. v. The 
Cookie Corner, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1251 (D. Haw. 2003) (“[F]or a 
genericness survey, majority usage controls.”) (internal citations omitted). 
203 See infra notes 271-274 and accompanying text. The Xerox Corporation 
has been fighting this trend for decades. See, e.g., Linford, Generislide, 
supra note 177 (describing Xerox’s efforts). 
204 See Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (Apr. 3, 
1950); Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 6 F. Supp. 859 
(E.D.N.Y. 1934); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. 272 F. 505, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 
1921) (holding that aspirin had become a generic mark to consumers, but 
not pharmacists, who were familiar with the chemical name 
acetylsalicylic acid). 
205 See Linford, Generislide, supra note 177 . 
206 Dogan & Lemley, Consumer Search Costs, supra note 82, at 794. 
207 Dogan & Lemley, Search-Costs Theory, supra note 181, at 1242 (“[T]he 
genericness doctrine can impose substantial search costs on consumers, 
particularly when a once-famous mark such as ‘aspirin’ or ‘thermos’ 
becomes generic.”). Courts do not always leave those confused consumers 
and the producers who sell to them without remedy. See infra notes 286-
301 and accompanying text. 
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Under the trademark incapacity doctrine, however, the use of a 
term as a nominative product designator always trumps 
adjectival trademark use, even if a majority of the public sees 
the term primarily as a trademark. It may nevertheless be the 
case that the junior user stands as a proxy for consumers who 
benefit from potentially confusing speech, or who easily process 
confusing ambiguity. Michael Grynberg, for example, has 
argued that courts should expressly recognize that the 
defendant in a trademark lawsuit can serve as a proxy for 
consumers who are not confused by and therefore may benefit 
from the junior user’s entry. Such a focus, from Grynberg’s 
perspective, would minimize problematic trademark 
expansion,208 and might be best applied when it is unclear how 
many consumers can tolerate confusion and how many suffer 
from it.  But if there is clear evidence about the relative size of 
the constituencies, then primary significance is the proper test 
for whether an ex ante generic term qualifies for trademark 
protection.  
If trademark law properly focuses on minimizing search 
costs for the majority of consumers,209 the trademark 
incapacity doctrine should give us pause. Applying the doctrine 
of trademark incapacity can increase consumer search costs. As 
scholars have recognized in the generislide context, favoring 
the perception of a dwindling minority of consumers that a 
word is a trademark harms the majority who see a former 
mark as a generic product identifier. If trademark law is to 
reduce consumer search costs, the law should apply the same 
primary significance standard to determine whether a shift in 
consumer perception has changed a product designation into a 
protectable source signifier. 
2. Rebutting the Competition Justification 
for Trademark Incapacity 
If avoidance of error costs does not explain trademark 
incapacity, perhaps courts are instead justified in ignoring 
restrictive shift in the trademark space on normative grounds. 
These normative justifications are roughly grouped together as 
aspects of competition policy and fall into three basic 
                                                
208 See Grynberg, supra note 182. Eric Goldman has made a similar 
argument in the internet search context, positing that at least some 
consumers benefit when a search for information about one vendor 
presents information about competing vendors (for example, presenting 
results for Adidas shoes when a searcher types “Nike”). See Goldman, 
supra note 182, at 525. 
209 See, e.g., Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of 
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1690-91 (1999). 
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categories. First, courts frequently observe that allowing a 
claimant to “convert common descriptive names, which belong 
to the public, to their own exclusive use”210 could provide the 
claimant with something approaching monopoly power. This 
language depletion argument presumes stasis in language 
change. But as the semantic shift literature makes clear, stasis 
is not a feature of living languages, and concerns about 
language depletion are likely overstated. Second, some courts 
and scholars ground competition policy in a preference for 
disruption or second entrants, but doing so privileges language 
change benefiting some parties over others. Finally, some 
courts and scholars have mistakenly grouped trademark 
incapacity cases with functionality cases, which consider 
whether a product feature (like springs holding up a 
construction sign) qualify for protection as source-signifying 
trade dress. But lumping generic terms in with product 
features misreads early case law. In addition, unlike generic 
terms, product features are relatively static. Indeed, as Romeo 
Montague recognized in Shakespeare’s play, the name of a 
thing is chimerical, while its features can be essential.211 
(1) Language Depletion and Monopoly 
Power 
Competition analysis is sometimes couched in terms of 
language depletion.212 The language depletion argument posits 
that protecting a previously generic term as a trademark 
conveys something akin to monopoly power.213 At the extreme, 
                                                
210 Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 848 
(1961). 
211 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, in THE OXFORD 
SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (W.J. Craig 
ed., 1914) (1597) (“What’s in a name? that which we call a rose / By any 
other name would smell as sweet.”). 
212 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Nationalizing Trademarks: A New International 
Trademark Jurisprudence?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729, 742-43 (2004) 
(describing how trademark incapacity prevents the removal of words from 
language through trademark propertization of generic terms); see also 
Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark Law: Greenlighting a Red 
Tide of Anti Competition Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263, 281 (2009) (“Providing an 
incentive for companies to coin fanciful trademarks makes a certain kind 
of sense if one is concerned about language depletion.”); Alexandra J. 
Roberts, How to Do Things with Word Marks: A Speech-Act Theory of 
Distinctiveness, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1055 (2014) (“If the PTO and courts 
overprotect descriptive marks by allowing their registration and 
enforcement without secondary meaning, they risk depleting the language 
available to competitors and chilling speech by granting a property right 
in a term that serves no trademark function.”). 
213 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
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the argument is likely correct at least some of the time. If we 
all use the word “computer” to refer to our personal information 
processing devices, sellers will likely need to use the word 
“computer” to sell competing devices to us. If one seller is 
allowed to secure trademark rights in COMPUTER as a mark, 
other sellers may not be able to tell consumers about their 
offerings without exposing themselves to legal liability. 
In a static lexicon, allowing a trademark owner to secure 
rights in a generic term would be problematic precisely because 
it is impossible to imagine other generic designations arising in 
a language that does not change. Trademark incapacity might 
thus prevent the removal of words from common language. 
However, in the absence of lexical stasis, the language 
depletion rationale is significantly weaker.214 Consider this 
modification of the aforementioned COMPUTER hypothetical. 
One of the first “computers” was imagined by Charles Babbage, 
who called his conceptual device an “analytical engine.”215 If 
you were to offer a new line of computing devices under the 
mark ANALYTICAL ENGINE, the term would be unfamiliar to 
most modern consumers. But the etymology would be 
problematic. The term would have a history, known to those 
familiar with Babbage’s work. If you tried to enforce your 
rights against me when I sell computers under a mark similar 
or identical to your ANALYTICAL ENGINE mark, a court may 
reject your claim in accordance with the trademark incapacity 
doctrine solely because the first computer imagined was known 
as an analytical engine. Thus, regardless of any evidence of 
source significance in the eyes of consumers, your claim against 
me would fail.216 
                                                
214 The depletion or word scarcity justification has more traction in the color 
depletion context, although the Supreme Court rejected a strong form of 
the color depletion rationale in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co., Inc. 
See 514 U.S. 159 (1995); supra note 76. Despite innovations in the color 
naming department—for example, Farrow & Ball offers paint in such 
obfuscatory varieties as babouche, pelt, and brinjal—we tend to think of 
colors as coming in three primary and three tertiary shades. In fact, many 
consumers cannot discern subtle differences in shade. The author, for 
example, scored a 31 on an online color-acuity test, suggesting a less than 
perfect ability to distinguish between similar shades. Colors can be, and 
are frequently renamed, but for many consumers, eggplant is just purple. 
The underlying color perceived does not change. 
215 See, e.g., ALEXANDER JOHN ANDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTER 
TECHNOLOGY 397 (1994). 
216 Rejecting your hypothetical claim would also be problematic for 
consumers who look to the mark ANALYTICAL ENGINE as a source for 
your computers and who would be confused by my use of the same term 
for similar products. See supra notes 201-209 and accompanying text. 
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Fears of language depletion are in fact likely overstated. 
For example, champagne was seen as a generic designation for 
sparkling wine until the term was retaken as a Geographic 
Indication within the European Union for sparkling wine 
produced in the Champagne district of France.217 Spanish 
producers of sparkling wine were forced to find a new identifier 
for their product, and chose cava.218 The language depletion 
rationale would lead one to expect that Spanish producers of 
sparkling wine would be crippled by the inability to use 
champagne. That does not appear to be the case. Sales of 
Spanish cava did not drop after the rechristening, either in 
Spain or the rest of Europe.219 In fact, one news outlet reported 
that as of 2002, Spain sold “more of its celebratory wine under 
the name of ‘cava’ than all the champagne from 
Champagne.”220 There is some indication, however, that U.S. 
consumers see cava as a cheap option compared to “authentic” 
champagne.221 This suggests cava may be an imperfect 
replacement for champagne. Cava producers may well invite 
some perception problems because they set an aggressively low 
price for cava.222 On the other hand, that perception may have 
driven consumers to cava during financial downturns, allowing 
cava to successfully compete as a low-cost entrant.223 
Furthermore, rejecting semantic shift based on the history 
of the word is a fallacy common to linguists and lexicographers. 
On occasion, new meanings are rejected based on the fallacy 
known as “argument from etymology.”224 An argument from 
                                                
217 See Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate 
About Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 321-23 (2006). 
218 Id. at 369. Cava is Spanish for “caves,” where wine was preserved or aged 
in the 1800s in the Catalonian region of Spain. 
219 L‘Espagne Effervescente en France, VINS MAG., Winter 2002, at 16 
(describing a growing success in northern France of sales of cava). 
220 French Wrath Produces Bitter Whine, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2002, http:// 
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/nov/29/20021129-102555-4226r. 
221 Lettie Teague, Cava Seeks to Make a New Name for Itself, WALL ST. J., 
July 4, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324183204 
578563500481816138 (describing a tasting where the tasters expressed 
unwillingness to pay $35 per bottle “for a Cava!” but might consider 
paying that price for Champagne). 
222 Victoria Moore, Cava: Why It’s Time to Stop Laughing at this Spanish 
Sparkler, THE TELEGRAPH, May 31, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/food 
anddrink/wine/10089672/Cava-why-its-time-to-stop-laughing-at-this-Span 
ish-sparkler.html. 
223 See, e.g., Nick Squires, Prosecco and Cava Have Edge on Champagne in 
Sparkling Wine Market, THE TELEGRAPH, Dec. 31, 2009, http://www.tele 
graph.co.uk/foodanddrink/wine/6914021/Prosecco-and-cava-have-edge-on-
champagne-in-sparkling-wine-market.html. 
224 See, e.g., GEOFFREY HUGHES, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH WORDS 27 (2000). 
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etymology refutes a semantic shift, or the growth of a new 
meaning, based on the perceived conflict between the new 
meaning and earlier meanings. As C.S. Lewis once trenchantly 
observed, however, resistance to language change often springs 
up precisely because a vocal minority is uncomfortable with 
how established words have taken on new meanings.225 
(2) Competition Policy and the 
Preference for Disruption 
Trademark incapacity might instead be normatively 
grounded in a different sort of competition analysis, based on a 
perceived right of competitors that trumps both the right of a 
putative mark owner and the understanding of consumers.226 
We might call it a preference for disruption, an assumption 
that any communication cross-cutting a dominant market 
player is valuable in and of itself. This disruption rationale is 
not entirely inconsistent with the marketplace of ideas 
                                                
225 C.S. LEWIS, STUDIES IN WORDS 18 (2d ed. 1967) (“Statements that honour, 
or freedom, or humour, or wealth ‘do not mean’ this or that are proof that 
it was beginning to mean, or even had long meant, precisely this or that. 
We tell our pupils that deprecate does not mean depreciate or that 
immorality does not mean simply lechery because these words are 
beginning to mean just those things. We are in fact resisting the growth of 
a new sense.”) (emphasis in original). 
226 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. Rebecca Tushnet has 
argued that the point of the functionality and de facto secondary meaning 
doctrines is to encourage competition “by preventing a single producer 
from obtaining rights in a phrase that is necessarily generic even if 
consumers associate the phrase with the market leader—as with AOL’s 
use of ‘You’ve Got Mail.’” Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always 
Right: Producer-Based Limits on Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 
YALE L.J. (THE POCKET PART) 352, 353 (2007) [hereinafter Tushnet, 
Producer-Based Limits]. Tushnet might also embrace trademark 
incapacity for the same reason she criticizes the dilution doctrine: “[A] 
doctrine that favors meanings approved by established producers above 
meanings offered by challengers . . . is anticompetitive.” Rebecca Tushnet, 
Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 507, 561 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, Sixty Milliseconds]; cf. 
Irina D. Mantra, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 853-54 (2012) (“[T]rademark 
bullying has become a persistent problem . . . achieving anti-competitive 
results.”). In Abercrombie, for example, the court identified a competitor’s 
“right to call an article by its name.” Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting 
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. Stephanie M. Greene, Sorting 
Out “Fair Use” and “Likelihood of Confusion” in Trademark Law, 43 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 43, 70-71 (2006) (arguing that allowing monopoly of a descriptive 
term creates a barrier to entry because a potential competitor cannot use 
the descriptive term and therefore must expend more effort to 
communicate with and attract consumers). But see Linford, Adverse 
Possessor, supra note 29, at 721-26 (responding to critiques of protection 
of descriptive terms from a productive use framework). 
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rationale for the First Amendment, which posits that the more 
speech we receive (collectively), the more likely that truth will 
win out.227 But the current incapacity doctrine defaults to an 
assumption that the harm from recognizing trademark rights 
to consumers and producers who use the term as a product 
designation is so great that it must trump any benefit to 
consumers who have come to see the mark as source-signifying, 
or to the producer who has invested resources in creating 
source significance. Thus, the ex ante bar against protecting a 
trademark derived from a generic designation is packaged as 
competition policy, but nonetheless grounded in the 
assumption that some competitors, and some consumers, merit 
protection over others. 
A doctrine favoring the junior user in the trademark 
incapacity context may do so because of a general distrust of 
trademark owners and the “black arts” of marketing. Recent 
trends include neuromarketing, which purports to make 
advertisement more effective by targeting subconscious rather 
than conscious responses.228 If marketers hold some power to 
influence consumer perception at a subconscious level, perhaps 
some courts properly distrust any evidence of shift in consumer 
perception.229 Unfortunately, discounting all evidence of 
consumer perception would effectively unravel the secondary 
meaning inquiry entirely and leave us with nothing but 
arguments from etymology. Even if we presume that marketers 
engage in emotional rather than practical appeals, consumers 
might still prefer to purchase products to which they feel an 
emotional connection.230 It is also not clear why we should 
assume marketing tricks are employed exclusively by the 
senior user, and not the junior user. Assessing the persuasion 
                                                
227 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the 
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace 
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance 
monopolization of that market . . . .”). 
228 See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Making Ads that Whisper to the Brain, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/business/14str 
eam.html. 
229 But see Levy, supra note 88, at 1213 (“While corporations with large 
marketing budgets undoubtedly have a great deal of power as language 
users, it is presumptuous to assume that a single corporation, even with a 
large marketing budget, has the ability to cause the majority of 
consuming America to forget that the mark is also a common name. It 
stands to reason that other forces are likely in play.”). 
230 Bone, Goodwill, supra note 120, at 602-03 (summarizing Phillip Nelson’s 
argument that critics lack a normative basis for distinguishing between 
good (properly adopted) and bad (advertising induced) preferences) (citing 
Philip Nelson, The Economic Consequences of Advertising, 48 J. BUS. 213, 
213 (1975)). 
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sophistication of consumers231 is a problem that applies to each 
interaction between a consumer and a seller, whether that 
seller is the first entrant or the most recent entrant.  
Finally, every semantic innovation is cabined by public 
acceptance or the lack thereof.232 For example, MTV used an 
advertising campaign in New York City in a failed attempt to 
insert new terms into the language, like round as a synonym of 
cool. If the new terms were adopted, the changes did not last, 
leading at least one scholar to conclude, “You cannot sell a 
language.”233 
(3) Functionality and Trademark 
Incapacity 
A third way to articulate the justification for trademark 
incapacity is to view it as part of a broader functionality 
doctrine.234 The Supreme Court’s functionality jurisprudence 
has been less than clear,235 and the Lanham Act fails to define 
the term. But it may only slightly oversimplify to say the 
functionality doctrine prevents an incumbent producer from 
barring new entrants from selling a product with a given 
feature, even if the product feature is clearly source-
signifying,236 so long as the feature is also one that a competitor 
needs to use in order to offer a competing product.237 For 
                                                
231 See Beebe, Search and Persuasion, supra note 27 at 2025. 
232 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. See also Hollmann, supra 
note 17, at 535 (describing a nonce-formation, a failed attempt to coin a 
new word). 
233 SETH LERNER, INVENTING ENGLISH 259 (2007). 
234 See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also Mark P. McKenna & 
Katherine J. Strandberg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2013) (“[T]rademark law subordinates its static 
competition goals to the patent and copyright systems’ judgments about 
how to encourage inventive and creative progress and promote dynamic 
competition.”). 
235 See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National 
Biscuit Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 
220 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter Dinwoodie, Story of Kellogg]. 
236 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 
213 (2000) (“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of 
competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that 
product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible 
threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent 
distinctiveness.”); Bone, Enforcement Costs, supra note 70, at 2180 (“The 
goal of the functionality doctrine is to strike a balance between limiting 
the acquisition of market power and reducing information-related 
consumer harms.”). 
237 There is some disagreement on whether functionality protects a right to 
compete or a right to copy. Compare Robert G. Bone, Trademark 
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example, if a product feature like a dual spring design on a 
traffic sign is considered an essential feature of the product,238 
then a putative mark owner cannot secure trade dress 
protection—protection for packaging and designs, rather than 
words or symbols—whether or not consumers perceive the 
feature as source-signifying.239 
On the surface, the functionality inquiry is similar to the 
trademark incapacity inquiry. But trademark incapacity does 
not fall within the umbrella of functionality for two 
interconnected reasons. First, the connection between 
functionality and trademark incapacity is due in part to a 
misreading of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kellogg Co. v. 
National Biscuit Co.240 The decision in Kellogg, which has an 
important functionality aspect,241 is also mistakenly treated as 
a progenitor of trademark incapacity.242 In Kellogg, the Court 
denied relief to National Biscuit, which sought to prevent 
Kellogg from selling a competing breakfast cereal in the same 
                                                                                                         
Functionality Revisited and Revised, at 21-22 (Univ. Tex. Law Sch., Law 
and Econ. Research Paper No. e554, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2433179 (noting the shift in functionality 
doctrine from protecting a right to copy to protecting the right to compete), 
and Dinwoodie, Story of Kellogg, supra note 235, at 246-47 (arguing that 
the Court has not been clear on whether patented product features are 
functional because the quid pro quo of patent protection requires those 
features to be thrust into the public domain, creating a right to copy, or 
because copying the features is necessary to sell the product and thus 
necessary to maintain a competitive infrastructure) with McKenna & 
Strandberg, supra note 234, at 29 (arguing that the right to copy 
unpatented features is the basis of the functionality doctrine because it 
provides the basis for free competition), and Mark P. McKenna, 
(Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 836-39 (2011) (suggesting that 
courts considering the functionality doctrine, at least from a patent 
perspective, have focused on the right of competitors to “share in the 
benefit of consumer desire for objects in a particular form” by copying that 
form, rather than the right to compete generally).  
238 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
239 See supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text. 
240 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
241 Id. at 122 (holding that defendant was entitled to make the biscuits at 
issue in a “pillow-shape,” because the shape “is functional” and “the cost of 
the biscuit would be increased and its high quality lessened if some other 
form were substituted for the pillow-shape”). 
242 See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 827, 880 n.229 (2004) (“The leading case on de facto 
secondary meaning is the Supreme Court’s decision in Kellogg . . . which 
held that there was no trademark rights in ‘shredded wheat,’ despite the 
fact that consumers recognized that there was a single source of the 
product.”). 
2015 Linguistic Justification for “Generic” Trademarks 
 
159 
“pillow” shape as National Biscuit (the functionality issue),243 
and using the name “shredded wheat” to do so (the ostensible 
trademark incapacity issue).244 The blend of the two concepts in 
the Court’s regrettably unclear opinion245 has understandably 
led some courts and commentators to think the same concerns 
animate both functionality analysis and application of the 
trademark incapacity bar. But Kellogg actually turns on 
whether the term “shredded wheat” had become or was 
currently operating as a generic designation, rather than its 
etymology as a generic term.246 Understanding semantic shift 
helps us understand how trademark incapacity and 
functionality turn on distinct issues. 
In Kellogg, National Biscuit sought to bar Kellogg’s sale of 
pillow-shaped breakfast cereal biscuits on the ground that both 
the shape of the biscuits and the name “shredded wheat” were 
distinctive source signifiers that identied the product as coming 
from National Biscuit.247 National Biscuit’s predecessor in 
interest held a patent in the pillow-shaped biscuits and the 
machinery to make them.248 The patents expired in 1912, 
thrusting the production method into the public domain.249 If 
the shape of the biscuits were treated as a protected source 
signifier, Kellogg could be barred from offering the biscuits for 
sale. The Court denied National Biscuit’s claim to trademark 
protection in the pillow shape.250 Because the biscuit patents 
had expired, the Court concluded that Kellogg had a right to 
copy the shape and the method for making the biscuits.251  
The Court in Kellogg also held that National Biscuit 
possessed no exclusive right to use “shredded wheat” as a 
                                                
243 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 119-22. 
244 Id. at 117-19, 121. 
245 See Dinwoodie, Story of Kellogg, supra note 235, at 238-39; 2 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 40, § 12:47. 
246 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 12:47 (“Although its opaque opinion is far 
from clear, the U.S. Supreme Court in [Kellogg] apparently held that all 
that plaintiff had proven was a minority usage or de facto secondary 
meaning in the generic name ‘shredded wheat.’”). 
247 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 115. 
248 Id. at 119-20 (“[O]n the expiration of a patent . . . there passes to the 
public the right to make the machine in the form in which it was 
constructed during the patent.”) (citing Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June 
Manufacturing Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)); Dinwoodie, Story of 
Kellogg, supra note 235, at 239. 
249 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 114 (“[The district court] held that upon the 
expiration of the [patent], the name of the patented article passed into the 
public domain.”); see also Dinwoodie, Story of Kellogg, supra note 235, at 
225. 
250 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 119-20. 
251 Id. at 119. 
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source signifier. While that part of the holding is cited as an 
early example of the trademark incapacity doctrine,252 the 
ruling instead turns primarily on the Court’s perception that 
National Biscuit never established “shredded wheat” was 
primarily a source signifier. The Court instead categorized 
National Biscuit’s evidence of source significance as 
insufficient.253 The Court never opined on what should happen 
if National Biscuit’s evidence established that “shredded 
wheat” was primarily a source signifier.254  
Kellogg is thus a peculiar starting place for the doctrine of 
trademark incapacity. The central feature of the doctrine is to 
deny protection to terms that were once generic, even in the 
face of probative evidence of primary source significance. 
Indeed, the Court noted that the patents on the process for 
creating the pillow shaped biscuits “repeatedly used” the word 
“‘shredded’ . . . as descriptive of the product.”255 In light of this 
use, the term “shredded wheat” was “essentially necessary” to 
describe the product.256 The Court also noted that Kellogg’s 
right to make the article included “the right to use the term by 
which the public knows it.”257 The present tense of “knows” 
here is telling. As the Court articulates, “shredded wheat” was 
a generic designation for the product in question when the case 
was decided.258 National Biscuit failed to show a change in 
                                                
252 See supra note 242. 
253 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 113 (“[T]o establish a trade name in the term 
‘shredded wheat’ the plaintiff must show more than a subordinate 
meaning which applies to it. It must show that the primary significance of 
the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the 
producer. This it has not done.”). 
254 In National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co., 91 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1937), the 
Third Circuit enjoined Kellogg’s use of the pillow shape and the term 
“shredded wheat.” The court concluded that the process for making the 
pillow-shaped biscuits entailed no shredding, and thus the term “shredded 
wheat” was suggestive and capable of bearing source significance. Id. at 
152-53. The court also seemed troubled that Kellogg had frequently 
changed the name of its pillow-shaped biscuit cereal. The court viewed 
these name changes as a deliberate attempt to deceive the public and free 
ride on National Biscuit’s goodwill. Id. at 153-55. The court was also 
persuaded that National Biscuit had successfully developed source 
significance in the term “shredded wheat,” id. at 153, and that the 
resulting “property right . . . should be respected,” id. at 154. 
255 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 117. 
256 Id. at 118. 
257 Id. at 117; see also id. at 118 (explaining that use of the name “shredded 
wheat” “was essentially necessary to vest the public with the full 
enjoyment of that which had become theirs by the disappearance of the 
monopoly”). 
258 In addition, the Court concluded that Kellogg clearly met that obligation, 
making “every reasonable effort to distinguish its product” from National 
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consumer perception.259 Kellogg has simply been 
misunderstood by many courts as a trademark incapacity 
case.260 
Even if one is inclined to engage in a broad reading of the 
genericness analysis in Kellogg, the question remains: Why did 
the Court bother to discuss National Biscuit’s failure to prove 
secondary meaning? If the Court meant that no generic term 
could acquire distinctiveness, why bother assessing the 
evidence of secondary meaning at all? As others have 
recognized, the opinion in Kellogg is a bit muddled,261 and 
while some read the Court to clearly establish a trademark 
incapacity bar, it did not do so cleanly.262 
Restrictive change happens all the time, while a shift in the 
necessity of offering a particular product or product feature 
most likely does not. Functionality assumes that the core 
aspects of products do not change over time.263 When a product 
or process has been patented, the public and competitors get 
the promise of eventual open competition after the patentee’s 
window of protection closes. This quid pro quo is built into the 
offer of patent rights to inventors. When the patent expires, the 
product, or the process of making it, becomes part of the public 
domain. Any competitor can then produce and sell the product, 
driving prices toward the marginal cost of production (what it 
costs to make the product) as multiple sellers begin offering 
competing products. This competition saves consumers money. 
When consumer demand changes, producers offer updated 
products to meet that demand. Product features in the public 
domain do not change, although their popularity might vary 
over time.264 The flagging popularity of a feature or process 
                                                                                                         
Biscuit’s product. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 116; see also infra notes 291-307 
and accompanying text (describing the limits of unfair competition 
protection in trademark incapacity cases). 
259 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118-19. 
260 Cf. McKenna & Strandberg, supra note 234, at 29 (citing Kellogg as an 
example of “longstanding Supreme Court precedent holding that there is a 
right to copy unpatented product features”). 
261 See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
262 I appreciate helpful feedback from Margaret Chon, Justin Hughes, and 
Mark McKenna on this issue. 
263 Cf. Joseph Miller, Error Costs & Functionality Exclusions, Presentation at 
Works in Progress in Intellectual Property 2014, Santa Clara University 
School of Law (Feb. 8, 2014) (arguing that the presumption that 
trademark protection is weaker than other regimes may hold true for 
word marks, but not for product design). 
264 For example, while most consumers experience music through their 
phones or computers, there is a limited but growing demand for vinyl 
records and record players. Ed Christman, Record Store Day: Just How 
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does not change its status within the public domain, although 
the lack of popularity may well discourage copying. The critical 
point is that the stasis that drives the functionality analysis for 
product features is suboptimal for analyzing competition 
concerns vis-à-vis the protection of word marks, because stasis 
is not a characteristic of living languages.265  
Finally, at its heart, the functionality doctrine is a tool for 
maintaining lines between intellectual property regimes. As 
the Supreme Court stated in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products 
Co., Inc.,266 the goal of the functionality doctrine is to prevent 
trademark law from trenching on the role of patent law and 
“inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to 
control a useful product feature.”267 Unlike the functionality 
doctrine, which polices boundaries between patent law and 
trademark law, trademark incapacity deals with the question 
of whether a generic term can be treated as though it has 
added source significance, a question internal to trademark 
law.268 
To summarize, in light of the tendency of language to 
undergo restrictive semantic shift, there is reason to doubt the 
error-cost justification for trademark incapacity. Likewise, 
rationales grounded in competition policy are too quick to 
dismiss language change and consumer perception and fail to 
vindicate applying trademark incapacity in its current form. 
The next section proposes applying a primary significance 
standard to determine whether generic terms can acquire 
trademark protection. 
B. The Primary Significance Test Best Measures 
Semantic Shift 
It is time to retire the trademark incapacity doctrine and its 
per se bar against protecting formerly generic terms. Instead, 
the law should apply a primary significance test. If there is 
evidence that the majority of consumers have come to see the 
term as source-signifying rather than merely product-
                                                                                                         
Big Is the Resurgence?, BILLBOARD, Apr.18, 2013 (reporting an upsurge in 
vinyl sales from 990,000 in 2007 to 4.5 million in 2012). 
265 Cf. Bone, Enforcement Costs, supra note 70, at 2157 (“[T]here is a special 
problem with protecting trade dress that does not apply to word marks. 
Enjoining other firms from using a design feature can impede competition 
in the product market when the design feature serves an important 
function for the product itself.”). 
266 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
267 Id. at 164. 
268 My thanks to Becky Eisenberg for this insight. 
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designating, the term should be protectable like any other 
trademark. 
As discussed above, courts faced with a genericness 
challenge to a protected mark apply a primary significance test 
to determine if the mark retains distinctiveness.269 As one court 
recognized, “[t]he critical issue in genericness cases is whether 
members of the relevant public primarily use or understand 
the term sought to be protected to refer to the genus of goods or 
services in question.”270 When considering whether a 
trademark has suffered generislide, “majority usage 
controls.”271 If the majority of consumers see a particular term 
as a trademark rather than a product category, generislide has 
not occurred.  
The traditional “Teflon” and “Thermos” surveys applied in 
generislide disputes investigate how consumers perceive and 
use the challenged mark.272 For example, in Ty, Inc. v. 
Softbelly’s, Inc.,273 a survey conducted by the plaintiff’s expert 
found that 60 percent of respondents identified BEANIES as a 
brand name for soft plush toys filled with beads. While that 
could also indicate that as many as 40 percent of respondents 
saw the term as a generic identifier, the court concluded that 
the 60 percent response rate was evidence that the primary 
significance of the mark was to designate the source of the 
plaintiff’s goods.274  
                                                
269 See supra notes 201-207 and accompanying text. 
270 H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989-
90 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
271 Big Island Candies, Inc. v. Cookie Corner, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1251 (D. 
Haw. 2003); see also Palladino, supra note 92, at 877 (noting that the 
genericness inquiry focuses on whether the primary significance of a 
challenged mark is to identify goods from a particular source, as opposed 
to the product itself). 
272 E.T. Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare Prods, Inc., 538 F.3d 185, 193 (3d. Cir. 
2008). Teflon and Thermos surveys differ in how they engage in the 
inquiry. Thermos surveys employ a series of open-ended questions, while 
Teflon surveys use closed-ended questions. See E. Deborah Jay, 
Genericness Surveys in Trademark Disputes: Evolution of Species, 99 
TRADEMARK REP. 1118, 1122 (2009). A Teflon survey explains the 
difference between product designations and trademarks to participants, 
and then asks participants to categorize terms like “washing machine” or 
“Chevrolet” as a generic designation or a trademark. If a majority of 
respondents categorize the mark as a generic designation, courts take that 
as evidence of generislide. A Thermos survey instead asks a respondent 
how she would ask for a product in a store. If the majority of consumers 
give the brand name, for example, “Thermos,” rather than “vacuum 
bottle,” the survey indicates that the mark has become generic. See E.T. 
Browne Drug, 538 F.3d at 195. 
273 353 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 2003). 
274 Id. at 530-31. While the court in Ty referred to the plaintiff’s survey 
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The same standard could be applied in acquired 
distinctiveness cases. Courts would inquire how consumers use 
the formerly generic term, and litigants could present survey 
evidence on the issue. Assuming the study is otherwise valid, if 
a majority of respondents identify the term as a trademark, 
then the study provides important evidence that the term has 
acquired secondary meaning and thus qualifies for trademark 
protection. Courts could also use information designed to 
anticipate consumer requirements, like search engine results, 
to track current usage.275 
The primary significance standard would also preserve a 
distinction in how frequently descriptive and generic terms can 
acquire trademark protection. The primary significance 
standard is a more exacting standard than the showing of 
secondary meaning required to secure protection in a 
descriptive mark. A primary significance standard would 
require that more than 50 percent of consumers perceive the 
mark as source signifying. That level of consumer recognition is 
sufficient, but not necessary, to establish that a descriptive 
mark has acquired secondary meaning.276 Many courts instead 
conclude that a showing in the 30 percent range is probative 
evidence that a descriptive term has acquired secondary 
meaning.277 Some might argue that primary significance sets 
too low a threshold for a generic term to acquire 
distinctiveness, but it is a higher bar than the law currently 
requires for protecting other categories of marks. 
                                                                                                         
evidence as probative, the defendant also failed to present its own survey 
evidence of genericness. 
275 See Lisa Larrimore Oullette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 
CAL. L. REV. 351, 354 (2014) (arguing that Google search engine results 
could “help adjudicate whether a mark has fallen into genericide”). 
276 Spraying Systems Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 394 (7th Cir. 1992); 
see also Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381 (7th 
Cir. 1976) (finding that responses to a likelihood of confusion survey 
indicated that over 50 percent of respondents identified plaintiff’s 
products with defendant’s mark, and concluding that “an extremely 
significant portion of the population associates [plaintiff’s] products with a 
single anonymous source”). 
277 Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 295 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(finding survey results in the 30 percent range probative of secondary 
meaning); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 
795 (5th Cir. 1983) (28 percent); Shuffle Master Inc. v. Yehia Awada, No. 
2:05–CV–01112–RCJ–(RJJ), 2006 WL 2547091, at *3 (D. Nev. 2006) (35 
percent); McNeil-PPC v. Granutec, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 198, 203 (E.D.N.C. 
1995) (38 percent). Other courts have held that survey results in the 30 
percent range are insufficient. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Actavis 
Group, No. 06 Civ. 8209(DLC), 2008 WL 228061, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(finding a 32 percent response rate insufficient to establish plaintiff’s color 
mark is source signifying as a matter of law). 
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In addition, applying the primary significance standard in 
the trademark acquisition context would not require a change 
to federal trademark law.278 The Lanham Act already includes 
language which embraces the concept of semantic shift. For 
example, a registered trademark can be cancelled if it “becomes 
the generic name for the goods or services . . . for which it is 
registered . . . .”279 Textually, the Act requires cancellation if a 
mark becomes generic, but not if a mark is currently source-
signifying, even if it was generic at one point.280 The Act also 
specifies grounds on which the Trademark Office may reject an 
application, including a determination that the mark “is merely 
descriptive” of the goods or services of the applicant.281 The 
statute does not grant refusal based on whether the mark was 
ever descriptive, but instead merely inquires whether the mark 
is descriptive at the time of application. While the statute does 
not compel this Article’s preferred prescriptive approach, it 
provides no obstacle to it. 
Some commentators have advocated instead for a 
replacement rule.282 Under a replacement rule, a generic term 
could only acquire trademark protection if the old meaning has 
been completely lost.283 At least one court reads Singer as a 
case where the trademark resurrection occurred precisely 
because the Singer mark “had wholly lost in then contemporary 
public usage its generic meaning.”284 In other words, SINGER 
                                                
278 See also 3 CALLMANN, supra note 9, § 20:33 (describing in detail how “[t]he 
Lanham Act does not appear to compel the retention of the trademark 
incapacity doctrine”); Levy, supra note 88, at 1211. 
279 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (L.A. § 14) (emphasis added).  
280 Congress prescribed the primary significance standard for determining 
whether generislide has occurred. See supra note 68 and accompanying 
text. 
281 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (L.A. § 2). 
282 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15, ill. 1 (1995) 
(proposing that a term that has a preexisting generic meaning cannot 
acquire trademark rights unless the preexisting generic meaning has 
become obsolete). 
283 See, e.g., Ex Parte Pocket Books, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182, 185-86 
(Chief Examiner 1951) (refusing registration for Pocket Book for pocket-
sized books and noting that “[i]t would appear that before the word could 
be considered a trade mark, it must become practically obsolete as a 
generic name for the article and must be recognized by the public as a 
trade mark rather than as a generic term of the English language” and 
that the “distinctiveness as a trade mark should not be recognized without 
complete overwhelming proof”). 
284 Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 
1981) (proposing that the court in Singer awarded trademark protection to 
a previously generic mark specifically because the term had fallen out of 
common linguistic use and reacquired a primary source-signifying 
meaning). 
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was protected as a trademark because no one used the word as 
a generic designator for sewing machines.  
But a replacement standard would fail to protect 
trademarks where there is clear evidence that a semantic shift 
has occurred and that the trademark meaning is the dominant, 
though not the exclusive meaning. Thus, the replacement rule 
would not go far enough in reforming trademark law. For 
example, a replacement rule would leave marks like KISSES 
without trademark protection, because nearly 17 percent of 
survey respondents identified KISSES as a generic term, even 
though 80 percent perceived KISSES as source-signifying.285 
Others might conclude that the common law of unfair 
competition, embodied in Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,286 
sufficiently protects the secondary meaning acquired in a 
generic mark, even though courts refuse to recognize evidence 
of secondary meaning and thus deny protection to those marks. 
Courts have applied unfair competition remedies to prevent 
“passing off” and to create some distance between senior and 
junior users of generic terms when the senior user has acquired 
de facto secondary meaning. For example, in Genesee Brewing 
Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co.,287 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit noted that a junior user is obligated to use “every 
reasonable precaution to prevent confusion or the practice of 
deception in the sale of its product,”288 even when using a 
generic product designation.289 The rationale is that the senior 
user’s claim to a mark is weak, and thus the senior user is 
entitled only to “relief that will eliminate public confusion 
over . . . sponsorship.”290  
There are two problems with relying on unfair competition 
remedies against passing off. First, cases like Genesee Brewing 
                                                
285 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
286 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
287 Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding HONEY BROWN generic as applied to ales and affirming denial 
of plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction). 
288 Id. at 151 (quoting Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 
(1938)).  
289 Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 150; see also Gaylord Entm’t Co. v. 
Gilmore Entm’t Grp., 187 F. Supp. 2d 926, 951 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (stating 
that a trier-of-fact could determine that the defendant engaged in unfair 
competition in its activities related to the adoption, promotion, and 
solicitation sales of the disputed mark, even if the term “Opry” were 
generic, so long as the unfair competition claim was not predicated solely 
on the defendant’s use of the term “Opry”). 
290 Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis v. L&L Exhibition Mgmt., Inc., 
226 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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may be the exception, rather than the rule.291 Many cases 
refuse to extend unfair competition protection to a generic 
term, even in light of evidence of actual consumer confusion. 
For example, in BellSouth Corp. v. White Directory Publishers, 
Inc., the court discounted evidence of consumer confusion on 
the ground that a mark, once dedicated to the public, could 
never be pulled back into trademark protection, and denied any 
relief.292 Cases like BellSouth call into question whether unfair 
competition law can do the work of recognizing semantic shift 
when it has occurred. 
Second, even when courts provide unfair competition relief 
to senior users, courts frequently rely on disclaimers requiring 
the junior user to disavow connection with the senior user as 
the only relief.293 For example, in Barton v. Rex-Oil Co.,294 
plaintiff was not entitled to protection of its registered 
trademark, DYANSHINE for shoe polish because the court 
concluded the mark was “merely descriptive” of the product.295 
The court nevertheless concluded that consumers were 
confused by the similarity of the names and directed the 
district court to order defendants to add an affirmative, 
prominent disclaimer stating that its DYE AND SHINE polish 
was not produced by the plaintiff.296 
                                                
291 See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 12:48 (opining that courts err 
when suggesting that they can create exclusive rights in generic terms 
under the law of unfair competition, and that the user of a generic term 
can obtain relief for passing off only if the newcomer engages in false and 
confusing usage “above and beyond mere use of the generic name”). 
292 42 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (“Where the record so 
conclusively establishes that a term was placed in the public domain as a 
generic symbol by its creator and has been so used for over thirty years by 
all in the industry, including the proponents of the mark and its 
predecessors, survey evidence such as that presented by BellSouth cannot 
serve even to create a genuine issue as to the status of the mark.”).  
293 See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded American Veterans Found., 
872 F.2d 1035, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (speculating that on remand, the 
district court could order the defendant “to attach a prominent disclaimer 
to its name to notify the public that defendant’s organization was not 
associated with plaintiff’s”); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Majestic Pictures 
Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 312-13 (2d Cir. 1934) (requiring defendant to include a 
disclaimer on advertisements for its film “Gold Diggers of Paris,” stating 
that defendant’s film was not based on an earlier play or film with the 
same title).  
294 2 F.2d 402, 406-07 (3d Cir. 1924). 
295 Id. at 404. Under the Federal Trade-Mark Act then in force, neither 
generic nor descriptive terms could be registered. Common law protection 
against unfair competition could still be obtained in a descriptive term. 
See id. (citing Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924)). 
296 Id. at 407. 
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Disclaimers, like the one ordered in Barton, are most likely 
ineffective. Rebecca Tushnet notes that prominent disclaimers 
might work when research respondents encounter “tombstone 
ads”—print-only ads that are highly informational—but they 
rarely work in the context in which they are encountered.297 
Other research suggests that disclaimers actually have a 
reverse effect: consumers presented with disclaimers are in 
many cases more likely to associate the product sold with the 
source disclaimed.298 
The failure of disclaimers to clear up confusion has been 
observed in other contexts as well. One FDA study indicates 
that in some cases, survey respondents were more confident 
that food provided health effects when the statement of the 
health effect was qualified or somewhat disclaimed than when 
the health claim was unqualified.299 Text-only disclaimers were 
ineffective at helping survey respondents recognize different 
levels of scientific support for certain health claims.300 In 
addition, disclaimers did not change the positive view of the 
health claim when consumers held an existing, erroneous belief 
in the claim.301 
A handful of cases suggest that a court could provide a 
stronger remedy for passing off than merely ordering a 
disclaimer. For instance, in Murphy Door Bed Co., Inc. v. 
Interior Sleep Systems, Inc.,302 the plaintiff sought to prevent 
the use of its registered MURPHY BED mark by the defendant 
                                                
297 Tushnet, Sixty Milliseconds, supra note 226, at 532 (citing Jacob Jacoby & 
Robert Lloyd Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigation: 
More Trouble than They Are Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35, 36, 54-58 
(1986)); see also Gita Venkataramani Johar & Carolyn J. Simmons, The 
Use of Concurrent Disclosures to Correct Invalid Inferences, 26 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 307, 320 (2000); Mitchell E. Radin, Disclaimers as a 
Remedy for Trademark Infringement: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 
TRADEMARK REP. 59, 61-67 (1986). 
298 Jacob Jacoby & George J. Szybillo, Why Disclaimers Fail, 84 TRADEMARK 
REP. 224 (1994). 
299 Brenda M. Derby & Alan S. Levy, Effects of Strength of Science 
Disclaimers on the Communication Impacts of Health Claims, (U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., Working Paper No. 1, 2005), available at http://www.fda 
.gov/OHRMS/dockets/dockets/03N0496/03N-0496-rpt0001.pdf (last viewed 
Nov. 7, 2014).  
300 Id. 
301 Id. The value of the FDA study in describing behavior of disclaimers more 
generally may be mitigated by a strong tendency of consumers to believe 
in specious health effects. See Ben Goldacre, The Medicalisation of 
Everyday Life, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 1, 2008 (arguing that consumers 
“invite [magical claims about health benefits] because we want to live in a 
simple universe of rules with justice, easy answers, and predictable 
consequences”).  
302 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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to sell a competing product. Although the court concluded that 
“Murphy bed” was generic for a bed that could be concealed in a 
wall closet, and the registration was thus invalid, it affirmed 
an injunction against the defendant. Murphy Door Bed is of 
limited use as unfair competition precedent supporting the 
grant of injunctive relief, however, because the defendant had 
agreed in a licensing deal not to use the Murphy name if the 
contract were ever terminated,303 and the court was not clear 
whether it was affirming the injunction on unfair competition 
or breach of contract grounds.304 
In other cases, courts have restricted subsequent confusing 
use of a generic term without enjoining the use per se. For 
example, in King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc.,305 
the court concluded that while King-Seeley’s THERMOS mark 
for vacuum bottles had fallen into generic usage in the minds of 
most consumers, some segment of the market still recognized 
THERMOS as a mark for King-Seeley’s goods.306 Thus, the 
court ordered injunctive relief requiring Aladdin to precede any 
use of the word “thermos” with its house mark, to confine its 
use of “thermos” to the lower-case “t,” and to never use the 
words “original” or “genuine” in describing its product.307 
If courts followed Murphy Door Bed in granting injunctions 
against the confusing use of “generic” marks that acquire 
secondary meaning, remedies against passing off would be 
sufficient to validate consumer perception. Even the 
replacement rule would be preferable over the status quo, 
which leaves the public and the mark owner at the mercy of 
ineffective disclaimers and the occasional judicial outlier. 
Nonetheless, the primary significance standard will better 
protect consumers from confusion and reduce consumer search 
costs by focusing the judicial inquiry on the acquired source 
significance of the term in question, rather than its generic 
etymology. 
                                                
303 Id. at 102. 
304 Compare id. at 102 (“Although the injunction was issued to prevent 
trademark infringement, it was proper because defendants had contracted 
to refrain from use of the Murphy name in the event of a termination of 
the distribution agreement and did not so refrain.”), with id. at 104 
(“[Defendants] committed breaches of their contract with Murphy and 
engaged in unfair competition. We therefore affirm the district court’s 
entry of a permanent injunction . . . .”). 
305 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963). 
306 Id. at 579 (“[T]here is an appreciable, though minority, segment of the 
consumer public which knows and recognizes plaintiff’s trademarks.”). 
307 Id. at 581. 
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CONCLUSION 
Semantic shift—the addition of meaning to the public 
lexicon—is driven simultaneously by a need to communicate 
and a need to resolve confusing ambiguity. Investing a word or 
phrase with source significance such that it becomes a 
trademark is a type of semantic shift. Like any other entry into 
the creative lexicon, trademarks are created to fill a 
communicative need. But the doctrine of trademark incapacity 
incongruously disregards restriction, a common form of 
semantic shift. Ignoring restriction may exacerbate consumer 
confusion and increase consumer search costs.  
Understanding that the formation of trademark meaning is 
a form of semantic shift reminds us that sound competition 
policy cannot neglect the importance of consumer 
comprehension. Instead, trademark law must take into account 
consumer perception and properly weight consumer confusion. 
The doctrine of trademark incapacity does neither. The law 
should instead adopt a primary significance test for 
determining whether a mark that was once generic has 
acquired sufficient distinctiveness to merit trademark 
protection. Trademark law would then better match its 
accepted search-cost rationale, and trademark acquisition 
would better reflect the semantic shift of which it is a part.  
This Article focuses on what the semantic shift literature 
can teach us about trademark incapacity. There is more work 
to be done in determining whether trademark law currently 
strikes the right balance between incumbents and new 
entrants and between interested groups of consumers. But an 
understanding of semantic shift provides crucial insight into 
how trademark owners as “speakers” initiate and maintain 
semantic shifts that create new trademark meaning, and how 
the public as “listeners” accept, reject, and reshape those 
attempts at source-signifying innovation. Incorporating 
theoretical and cognitive research on language change may 
help us better evaluate the key descriptive and normative 
claims for the current trademark regime at each phase in the 
lifecycle of a trademark. Thus, recognizing how language 
changes can spur effective legal reform that better reflects the 
consumer protection and competition concerns at the heart of 
the trademark system. 
